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ABSTRACT 
MEGAN JOHNSON 
THE MYTH OF WARREN COURT ACTIVISM 
 
MAY 2013 
 Judicial activism and the Warren Court became synonymous, in the 1980’s, with 
the rise of originalism.  However, the first time the term, judicial activism, was employed 
it was applied to the Hughes Court.  This thesis compares the two Courts to determine if 
the originalist labeling of the Warren Court as an activist court is appropriate.  The 
evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that judicial activism is a term that fails to 
capture the inherent complexities found in the interpretation of constitutional law when 
applied to either Court.  It further suggests that originalism, as a jurisprudential theory, 
would be capable of producing the same type of results oriented decisions that 
originalists accused the Warren Court rendering.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
During the twentieth century a term – judicial activism – emerged regarding the 
behavior of the Supreme Court which later entered the vernacular of politicians and 
common people alike. The term was first introduced and applied to the Hughes Court
1
 
after it struck down numerous pieces of New Deal legislation.
2
  By the 1980’s, the rise of 
high profile public figures
3
 who advocated originalism
4
 had made the term “judicial 
activism” synonymous with the Warren Court5 and the Hughes Court – the original 
activist court – was forgotten in the public mind.  However, the two courts were regarded 
as activist courts for completely different reasons.  The Hughes Court was seen as an 
activist court because it struck down federal legislation that attempted to bring about the 
regulatory state.  Whereas the Warren Court was viewed as an activist court because it 
overturned state legislation that resulted in discriminatory practices. When trying to 
discern whether or not an activist label is appropriate for the Warren Court it is, thus, 
                                                          
1
 The Supreme Court under the tenure of Chief Justice Charles Hughes from 1930-1941. 
2
 The New Deal was a series of federal programs that had been launched by the President Franklin 
Roosevelt and Congress in the hopes of bringing an end to the Great Depression. 
3
 Such as Ronald Reagan, Edwin Meese  and Robert Bork 
4
Originialism is a jurisprudential theory that describes how judges should interpret the Constitution. It was 
created in response to activist decisions that were rendered by the Warren Court.  It includes original 
intent and original understanding and suggests that judges look to the Founders as a way to neutrally 
interpret the Constitution.  Judicial activism and originalism are two distinct concepts.  Judicial activism is 
not easily definable and it changes over time. One of the goals for this thesis is to create a definition. 
Originalists are scholars who subscribe to an originalist jurisprudence, as defined above, and who 
frequently accuse the Warren Court of committing judicial activism.  
5
 The Supreme Court under the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren from 1953-1969.    
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right to ask if the Warren Court was an activist court in light of the differences that 
existed between it and the Hughes Court?   
This thesis explores this question by using various legal decisions from each 
Court and other primary sources concerning originalism and judicial activism as well as 
contemporary scholarship to answer the question of how to most accurately label these 
two Courts. Furthermore, this thesis will show that the existing literature concerning 
judicial activism, either tries to define it, defend it, or criticize it, but none of these 
scholars have asked whether or not the label was appropriate as applied to the Warren 
Court.  Finally, this thesis will examine the ironies associated with originalism in regards 
to its criticisms of the Warren Court and the ideas it advanced. 
One of the major problems with judicial activism is that its definition is not static. 
Keenan D. Kmiec attempted to “clarify the meaning of ‘judicial activism’ when it is used 
in different contexts…”6  Kmiec observed that it can be quiet confusing when 
determining whether or not a judicial activism label is appropriate for a decision rendered 
by any court because the meaning seems to change.  Kmiec notes that it was, indeed, 
Schlesinger – in a Fortune magazine article – who coined the term judicial activism in 
reference to the Hughes Court in 1947.  There was a fatal flaw in the article for while 
Schlesinger was the first person to use the term he “fail[ed] to define his terms with 
precision.”7  Kmiec argued that the term became much more common as the twentieth 
century progressed.  When Kmiec wrote this article, in 2004, he observed that there were 
                                                          
6
 Kmiec, Keenan D. “The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism”.” California Law Review, 2004: 
1448. 
7
 Ibid, p. 1449 
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at least five different definitions of the word. According to Kmiec judicial activism can 
refer to “(1) invalidation of the arguably constitutional actions of other branches, (2) 
failure to adhere to precedent, (3) judicial ‘legislation,’ (4) departures from accepted 
interpretive methodology, and (5) result-oriented judging.”8  Kmiec concluded by stating, 
“Today, a charge of ‘judicial activism’ standing alone means little or nothing because the 
term has acquired so many distinct and even contradictory meanings.”9 
In this thesis, originalism also presented the same problem that judicial activism 
does because originalism is also a fluid concept.  Keith Whittington asserted that 
originalism was born as a reactive philosophy to the decisions that were coming out of 
the Warren Court.
10
  By the 1980’s originalism had reached its heights with people such 
as Robert Bork, Edwin Meese and Raul Berger.  However, the originalists at that time 
still had not developed any affirmative philosophy. In other words, they knew what they 
were against – the Warren Court – but they did not know what they stood for.  The new 
orginialists, according to Whittington, are “less likely to emphasize a primary 
commitment to judicial restraint”11 and are “focused less on the concrete intentions of 
individual drafters of the constitutional text than on the public meaning of the text that 
was adopted.”12  Did judicial activism change in the period of time between the 
publication of the Schlesinger article and the Warren Court? 
                                                          
8
 Ibid, p. 1444 
9
 Ibid, p. 1477 
10
 Whittington, Keith. “The New Originalism.” Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, 2004: 109-119  
11
 Ibid, p. 116 
12
 Ibid, p.116 
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Thomas Keck, Alpheus Thomas Mason, and Robert Bork compared the Hughes 
and Warren Courts as well as each Court’s resulting activism. In his work, Keck 
described concepts of liberal and conservative activism.
13
  Keck wrote that conservative 
activists are most interested in policing the boundaries of government and ensuring a 
limited federal government, whereas, liberal activists are more concerned with protecting 
the rights and interests of groups that have historically not been protected by the electoral 
process while also upholding regulations and the welfare state both of which conceivably 
intrude upon the interest of the states and individuals.  While both descriptions accurately 
describe the conservative Hughes Court and the liberal Warren Court, the same glaring 
omission from Arthur Schlesinger’s 1947, Fortune magazine article, can also be found in 
Keck which is the failure to define judicial activism in a single term that is applicable 
across the ideological spectrum.  In fairness, Keck was looking at what the Court did 
during the tenure of conservative and liberal chief justices, and how the balance of power 
concerning liberals and conservatives had the ability to increase or decrease activism.  
However, one is left to wonder precisely what judicial activism was and how it could be 
correctly applied. 
Mason, like Keck, ascribed different characteristics of judicial activism to the 
Hughes and Warren Courts.  While Mason did note a few examples of activist behavior 
from the Court before the New Deal, he saw the Hughes Court as the protector of private 
property and dual federalism; a process he described as “negative activism.”  The Warren 
                                                          
13
 Keck, Thomas M. The Most Activist Supreme Court in History: The Road to Modern Judicial 
Conservatism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004. 
 5 
 
Court, Mason asserted, ensured equal representation of the people and sought the 
protection of the individual from the government at all levels which was the very thing 
the Founders had intended it to do.  Mason stated, “the judiciary has always been an 
instrument of government, actively involved in politics...”14  Mason wrote, “Prior to 
1937, the Justices fashioned around the ‘due process’ clauses and other constitutional 
provisions a penumbra of economic theory to defeat regulation of the economy.  Chief 
Justice Warren’s Court has embellished the Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights 
and the fourteenth amendment, with political theory – the doctrine of egalitarianism – to 
protect and promote civil liberties.”15 
Bork reviewed the “increasing politicization of the Court16” from the founding of 
a federal judiciary to the Rehnquist Court.  Bork viewed New Deal legislation as an 
attack on federalism and felt the Hughes Court was not completely wrong for invalidating 
legislation at the beginning of Franklin Roosevelt’s first term as President.  Bork 
characterized the Warren Court as “stand[ing] first and alone as a legislator of policy, 
whether the document it purported to apply was the Constitution or a statute.”17 Oddly, 
Bork thought that decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education and Baker v. Carr were 
the right decisions to make constitutionally, however, the reasons given for these 
decisions were on weak constitutional grounds.  Other decisions rendered by the Warren 
Court, such as Griswold v. Connecticut, were labeled as value-voting decisions.  It should 
                                                          
14
 Mason, Alpheus Thomas. “Judicial Activisim: Old and New.” Virginia Law Review, 1969: 386. 
15
 Ibid, p. 389  
16
 Bork, Robert H. The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1990. 12 . 
17
 Ibid, p. 69 
 6 
 
be noted that Bork accused both courts of value-voting.  Concerning the Warren Court he 
wrote, “The Warren Court’s philosophical thrust was… egalitarian and 
redistributionist.
18” Bork was not as harsh towards the Hughes Court when he wrote, 
“The Supreme Court’s behavior, its systematic frustration of the political branches, 
eventually erupted in a constitutional crisis.  But the crisis arose less because the Court’s 
behavior was illegitimate than because the judge-made values it protected suddenly went 
out of political and intellectual fashion.”19 
Leslie F. Goldstein and Jeremy Waldron criticized the concept of judicial review 
which is one of the definitions of judicial activism while Johnathan O’Neil defended 
originalism as a legitimate critique against the Warren Court. Goldstein’s thesis was that 
there is a troubling trend in public law scholarship where scholars defend the practice of 
judicial review as long as it is done in the name of protecting fundamental rights that are 
not found nor implied within the text of the Constitution.
20
  Goldstein likens these types 
of decisions to those of the Platonic Guardians.  While there was a concession that the 
United States has a history of unwritten law, Goldstein insisted that a written Constitution 
exists for a reason – more specifically so that judges, at least Supreme Court Judges, do 
not wander off into the natural law realm. 
Waldron attempted to show that judicial review is flawed in two ways.  He 
argued, “First… there in no reason to suppose that rights are better protected by this 
                                                          
18
 Ibid, p. 84 
19
 Ibid, p. 51 
20
 Goldstein, Leslie F. “Judicial Review and Democratic Theory: Guardian Democracy vs. Representative 
Democracy.” The Western Political Science Quarterly, 1987: 391-412. 
 7 
 
practice (judicial review) than they would be by legislatures.  Second… judicial review is 
democratically illegitimate.”21  Waldron based his critique of judicial review on four 
assumptions which were firstly that we live in a “society with democratic institutions in 
reasonably good working order.
22”  Second, we have “a set of judicial institutions… 
setup on a nonrepresentative basis… (to) uphold the rule of law.”23  Third, there was a 
commitment by “most members of the society and most of its officials to the idea of 
individual and minority rights.”24  Finally, there existed a “good faith disagreement about 
rights… among members of the society.”25  Waldron admitted that most of his work in 
this article was abstract and that it would be possible for some of these assumptions to 
fail if they were applied to concrete cases.  He further admitted that if his assumptions 
fail his entire argument fails.  However, Waldron insists that even if his argument fails 
there still might be other great arguments against judicial review that one should 
consider.  Waldron concluded by stating that there may be some valid reasons for judicial 
review, however, judicial review on the basis of rights “is inappropriate (in) reasonably 
democratic societies whose main problem is not that their legislative institutions are 
dysfunctional but that their members disagree about rights.”26 
                                                          
21
 Waldron, Jeremy. “The Core Case Against Judicial Review.” The Yale Law Journal, 2006: 1346. 
22
 Ibid, p.1360 
23
 Ibid, p. 1360 
24
 Ibid, p. 1360 
25
 Ibid, p. 1360 
26
 Ibid, p. 1406 
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Johnathan O’Neill contended that the Framer’s intent, or historical intent, was 
always considered in constitutional interpretation before the twentieth century.
27
  As the 
United States entered the twentieth century, the Supreme Court began to use a formalist 
approach to interpretation where the law became categorized but historical intent was not 
forgotten.  After engaging legal realism and the notion of a living constitution, the Court 
entered a period where it used a process approach.  The process approach can be 
characterized by the judiciary giving extreme deference to legislatures.  The process 
approach is associated with the Hughes Court, the New Deal Court, after it ceased to 
render Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation as unconstitutional.  O’Neill argued that the 
process approach lasted from the time of the New Deal until the end of the Warren Court.  
However, after the Civil Rights decisions, rapidly increased incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights, and the Reapportionment Cases, process critics had emerged so that by the end of 
the Warren Court ideas of orginalism and textualism were blossoming into their own full-
fledged Constitutional theories designed specifically to combat the perceived weakness of 
the constitutional reasoning of the Warren Court.  This is why it is almost impossible to 
discuss the judicial activism of the Warren Court without also discussing originalism.  
The entire raison d’être for the nascence of originalism was to critique what 
conservatives viewed as the judicial activism of the Warren Court. 
Jack N. Rakove contended that the case that is largely thought to be responsible 
for judicial review in American jurisprudence, Marbury v. Madison, was really nothing 
                                                          
27
 O’Neill, Johnathan. Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional History. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. 
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more than an issue of federalism.
28
  That is, the Supreme Court was not necessarily 
striking down legislation, rather, it was stopping one branch of government from 
encroaching upon another.  While Rakove discussed the Marshall Court, his article does 
put the idea of judicial review into a different context, namely that scholars have asserted 
that the traditional role of the Court was to police the boundaries of government.  During 
the New Deal, the Hughes Court viewed much of Roosevelt’s legislation as an 
infringement of state’s rights which was why, before 1937, the Court struck down most 
of the federal legislation. Additionally, the Court’s cessation of policing boundaries did 
not occur until 1937 when the notion of legislative supremacy took root in constitutional 
law, before that judicial supremacy was almost absolute.  However, the Warren Court 
changed everything because it was seen as doing something entirely different. The 
Warren Court was viewed as a super legislature that was allocating newly created rights 
to the people as it trampled on notions of legislative supremacy at the state level.  
Therefore, one is left to wonder how the Hughes Court can be viewed as an activist court 
once it is placed in the historical context concerning the role of the Court from the 
founding until that time period.  Similarly, if it is true that the Warren Court deviated 
from the normative function of the Supreme Court and a standard of constitutional 
interpretation that had been historically employed, would it necessarily follow that it 
could be legitimately labeled as an activist Court? 
                                                          
28
 Rakove, Jack N. “The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts.” Stanford Law Review, 1997: 
1031-1064. 
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Daniel Levin, Stephen Breyer, Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Martin Shapiro, Terri 
Jennings Perretti, David A Strauss, and H. Jefferson Powell do not address issues of 
judicial activism.  Rather, they question the validity of originalism in regards to its 
concrete application.  Levin wrote that originalists “seek to halt the historical 
transformation of the language and principles of the Constitution that occur in every 
generation… By returning to an origin myth of the Constitution featuring the document’s 
ratification by the ‘people,’ these contemporary orginalists attempt to reconstruct 
American constitutionalism in a populist mode that casts liberal jurisprudence as 
essentially undemocratic.”29  Levin argued that originalists value heritage over history 
while defining heritage as a fixed idea that never changes.  He wrote, “Heritage is anti-
intellectual because it appeals more strongly to the experience of location and materiality 
than it does to the historical narrative itself.”30  Furthermore, our understanding of history 
is constantly changing as new interpretations emerge.  Therefore, the originalist 
association of heritage is a denial of history rather than an embracement of it. 
Breyer asserted that the Supreme Court is charged with interpreting and applying 
the Constitution in a concrete way that works with the understanding of American 
principles in the twenty first century unlike the originalists who, Breyer claims, would 
have American judges consult the eighteenth century views of the Founders in order to 
answer pertinent issues in today’s society.  Additionally, Breyer contended that it is not 
the job of a Justice to consult history when adjudicating, rather, it is the job of the Justice 
                                                          
29
 Levin, Daniel. “Federalists in the Attic: Original Intent, the Heritage Movement, and Democratic 
Theory.” Law & Society Inquiry, 2004: 107. 
30
 Ibid, p. 123 
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to take a pragmatic approach that “ecompas[es] efforts that consider and evaluate 
consequences.”31 Breyer asked, “If the Court is to decide major constitutional questions 
on the basis of history, then why not ask nine historians, rather than nine judges to 
provide those answers?”32  Of course, Breyer’s question leaves one to assume that the 
historical intent is not as important as originalists would have people believe. 
Culp argued that “legal scholars, judges, and law students… approach question of 
law from a perspective that excludes back concerns.”33  Regarding originalism Culp 
wrote, “Most American’s believe that because race is not mentioned, it cannot be a 
pivotal issue…34 To rely on original intent is to hitch our interpretational scheme to a 
vision that excluded blacks.”35  Culp argued that there are four typical reasons that are 
used to justify original intent and its exclusion of the black perspective. First, while the 
Constitution was not perfect because it excluded women and minorities, it was eventually 
perfected to include all people.  Second, there is no way to know what concessions blacks 
could have gotten at the Constitutional Convention even if they would have been allowed 
to participate.  Third, “blacks had nothing to add to the process of defining American 
Citizenship.”36 Finally, the Constitution acts as a contract between the people and the 
government.  If blacks “did not like this contract, (they) could have left the American 
                                                          
31
 Breyer, Stephen. Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View. New York: Vintage Books, 2010. 82. 
32
 Ibid, p. 77 
33
 Culp, Jr., Jerome McCristal. “Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings.” Duke 
Law Journal, 1991: 42. 
34
 Ibid, p.67 
35
 Ibid, p. 69 
36
 Ibid, p. 72 
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republic.”37 Culp rejected all of these justifications and concluded that originalism 
requires “black concerns to defer to white concerns.”38 While Culp was dealing 
exclusively with black concerns, a larger question looms over originalists claims which 
is: why are the American people not at liberty to change the Constitution in a way that 
conforms to the norms of society in every generation given that so few people were even 
consulted in the creation and adoption of the Constitution in the first place?  
Shapiro contended that “American politics has been Constitution-centered from 
the very beginning, and lawyers play a disproportionate role in political life.”39 Since 
American politics is “Constitution-centered” it is common to see the people and their 
politicians take political stands concerning judicial outcomes of important cases in any 
particular period which is what happened during the Progressive Era, the New Deal, and 
Civil Rights Movement.  Shapiro did not deny that judicial review has become more 
common place in the twentieth century nor did he deny that it has actually expanded into 
the area of administrative law.  However, Shapiro argues that an expansion of judicial 
review is actually a good thing for the American people because it forces their 
legislatures and bureaucracies to reconsider legislation or directives since they know it is 
possible for the courts to strike them down.  Shapiro stated, “Juridicalization does not 
substitute judicial policy-making for legislative or administrative policy-making, or even 
                                                          
37
 Ibid, p. 73 
38
 Ibid, p. 75 
39
Shapiro, Martin. ”Juridicalization of Politics in the United States.” International Political  Science Review, 
1994:  101. 
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provide judges with the last word in the policy process.  It simply adds judges as another 
category in the broad and multifaceted array of policy makers.”40 
Peretti asserted that there is no clear meaning found in the text of the Constitution 
and that clarity is only found through opinions authored by Supreme Court Justices.  
Furthermore, value-voting is a manifestation of what the public wants and not necessarily 
a reflection of a judge’s personal values.  Peretti wrote, “Value-voting is not merely the 
arbitrary expression of a justice’s idiosyncratic views.  Rather, it is the expression and 
vindication of those political views deliberately ‘planted’ on the Court by an ideology-
conscious and politically accountable president and Senate.”41  Peretti also rejected the 
idea that the legitimacy of the Court is threatened when judges employ value-voting.  
Citing numerous scholars, Peretti demonstrated that the public was more interested in the 
Court’s decision than the process the Court used to make the decision. 
Strauss rejected the notion that either originalism or textualism were the only 
plausible ways to restrict a judge’s prerogative.  Strauss contended that traditional 
common law contains better methods of judicial restraint because of the long standing 
tradition of legislative deference.  Additionally, precedent is a foundation of both the 
common law and Anglo-American law which means ideas of origrinalism and textualism 
only work (or are only conservative) with the application of precedent.  As Strauss 
pointed out, the equal protection clause gives judges a great deal of discretion if the judge 
simply looks at the text and ignores precedent concerning it.  Furthermore, the common 
                                                          
40
 Ibid, p. 109 
41
 Perretti, Terri Jennings. In Defense of a Political Court. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 133. 
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law does not require people in the twentieth century to adopt the ideas and beliefs of 
people in the eighteenth century.  That is, judges are able to make incremental changes as 
society changes. Strauss concluded by writing, “Originalist and textualist approaches 
often find themselves in the position of making exceptions for, or apologizing for, or 
simply being unable to account for, some of the most prominent features of our 
constitutional order.  The common law approach greatly reduces the need to do any of 
that.  It forthrightly accepts, without apology, that we depart from past understandings, 
and that we are often creative in interpreting the text.”42 
Powell sought out “the historical validity of the claim that the ‘interpretive 
intention’ informing the Constitution was an expectation that future interpreters would 
seek the instrument’s meaning in the intention of the delegates to 1787 Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia.”43  Powell made two points.  First, he stated that originally 
the Constitution was seen a contract between the states and the federal government and 
not as, in contemporary times, a contract between the government and the people.  
Second, there had been a push that began in England, after the Protestant Reformation, 
which extended to the colonies and subsequently carried over into the founding of the 
American Republic, to get rid of unwritten traditions.  Originalists, according to Powell, 
might rightly be able to make a claim in support of strong states’ rights, however, they 
would not be able to support other notions that originalists claim to find in the Founders’ 
                                                          
42
 Strauss, David A. “Common Law Constitutional Interpretation.” The University of Chicago Law Review, 
1996: 934-935. 
43
Powell, H. Jefferson. “The Original Understanding of Original Intent.” Harvard Law Review, 1985: 886. 
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intentions, such as the absolute rights of property owners.
44
 Powell concluded that it 
would be a mistake to assume that original intent meant the same thing in early 
nineteenth century America that it means today.  Furthermore, the evidence is ambivalent 
concerning whether or not the Framers wanted contemporary Americans to interpret the 
Constitution based on their intent.  
None of these scholars have addressed what judicial activism is or when it can be 
appropriately applied to the Supreme Court.  Judicial activism, admittedly, has its own 
virtues and vices, but when should scholars, politicians, and society take it upon 
themselves to declare a Court as an activist court? Additionally, why have originalist 
scholars been able to unilaterally label the Warren Court as an activist while not being 
challenged over that label?
45
 It should also be noted again that originalism was created 
after Earl Warren became Chief Justice in direct response to decisions his Court rendered.  
This is important because the activism of the Hughes and Warren Courts were different.  
The Warren Court was judged by a different standard than the Hughes Court.  The 
Warren Court was not considered an activist court until it had already handed down 
several landmark cases.  Originalists were able to look at what the Warren Court did and 
create a standard for judicial activism that just happen to coincide with decisions they did 
not like.  Originalists then claimed that it was not their dislike of a decision that rendered 
it as activism, rather it was the deviation from the intentions of the Founding Fathers that 
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resulted in the just labeling of those decisions as judicial activism. The framework for 
judicial activism, as defined by originalists, came after – not before – controversial 
decisions of the Warren Court.  In other words, originalists have been able to change the 
standard of judicial activism concerning the Warren Court in ways that have remained 
unchallenged.  
In a broad sense, I again ask if it is appropriate to label the Warren Court as an 
“activist” court in light of the differences that existed between it and the Hughes Court?  
The activism produced by the Hughes and Warren Courts were markedly different in 
practice, yet they both similarly ran afoul of the then contemporary notion that judges 
should defer to legislatures.  Thus, there is another question at play concerning the 
labeling of judicial activism which is: are abstract principles or the concrete 
consequences of a decision more important in labeling a court as an activist court?  It is 
my contention, therefore, that the concrete application of the Constitution holds a higher 
standing than abstract notions regarding the method that ought to be used in interpreting 
the Constitution; furthermore, since the Warren Court applied the Constitution in very 
different ways than the Hughes Court did and because the Hughes Court set the threshold 
for judicial activism when it became the first court to be labeled as an activist court, the 
labeling of the Warren Court as an activist court is unwarranted, inappropriate, and 
ahistorical. 
 This thesis will consist of three additional chapters.  The next chapter addresses 
the activism of the Hughes Court, and it is essentially divided into two sections.  The first 
section deals with the Court overturning New Deal legislation since activism committed 
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by the Hughes Court is normally relegated to the economic sphere.  The second section is 
concerned with decisions rendered by the Hughes Court that advanced civil liberties for 
all Americans and laid the foundation for decisions that would help advance the cause of 
civil rights for future courts.  The third chapter addresses the Supreme Court under the 
tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren.  This chapter is divided into five sections.  The first 
section gives some brief biographical information about Chief Justice Earl Warren.  The 
next section examines some landmark decisions rendered by the Warren Court.  The third 
section addresses the jurisprudence of originalism both its critique of the Warren Court 
and what it is conceptually.  The final section looks to how an originalist interpretive 
method has historically hurt minorities in the United States and Earl Warren’s explicit 
rejection of it.  The last chapter, the conclusion, will discuss the findings of this thesis, 
the evolution of my research, and the implications this thesis will have for future 
research. 
The sources used for the first section of the Hughes Court chapter were chosen to 
provide some historical background concerning the events leading up to and surrounding 
the New Deal decisions that were rendered by the Court – this includes both secondary 
and primary sources – as I was attempting to discern if there was any historically valid 
reason, other than activism, for the Court to overturn New Deal legislation.  The second 
section of this chapter uses both primary and secondary sources to establish a trend line 
which demonstrates the Supreme Court was making advances in civil liberties well 
before Earl Warren became Chief Justice.  This was a trend that needed to be shown 
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because the activism that the Warren Court is accused of tends to be relegated into a 
protectorate sphere of individual and civil rights as well as civil liberties. 
The first two sections of chapter three use primary and secondary sources to 
discuss biographical information about Warren in the context of landmark decisions that 
were rendered under his tenure.  The primary sources are Supreme Court cases which are 
needed for the case studies.  An additional primary source, Earl Warren’s memoirs, was 
chosen specifically to write about Warren in a personal way because he, unlike Hughes, 
was individually targeted along with the Court by critics.  Section three basically uses 
primary sources regarding originalism.  These sources also establish what originalism is 
conceptually and why it is unable to provide a valid jurisprudential theory to counter the 
actions of the Warren Court. The primary sources for this section were written by 
scholars who were instrumental in the creation of originalism, and since judicial activism 
is not a static term, their writings proved essential to combat their own conceptions of it.  
The final section of this chapter uses primary and secondary sources to chart the Supreme 
Court’s understanding of its responsibility to either uphold or abolish a caste system in 
America and how a caste system might have remained in place if the Warren Court had 
used originalism when it rendered its decisions.    
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CHAPTER II 
THE HUGHES COURT AND THE NEW DEAL 
The conventional New Deal narrative states that, in 1932, during the Great 
Depression a charismatic leader was elected to the office of President of the United 
States. Once there, Franklin Roosevelt set out to fix the nation’s economy with legislation 
that attempted to use constitutional powers in unprecedented ways.  The Supreme Court 
acted as a barrier to progress and, consequently, was viewed as an obstruction to the will 
of the people when it struck down provisions of New Deal legislation on constitutional 
grounds. 
46
 
The traditional account of the New Deal regarding the switch in time is flawed 
and thus not able to render a completely accurate reason regarding why the Court 
seemingly went from overturning New Deal legislation to upholding it.  Contemporary 
scholarship that questions not only the reasons for the switch in time but also the very 
notion of the switch in time itself unintentionally serves as a guide to the  judicial  
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activism the Hughes Court was accused of committing.
47
  However, the propagation of  
the conventional narrative does a disservice to the decisions the Hughes Court rendered 
during its tenure.  This chapter will show that the only definitive explanation for both the 
Court’s deferential stance on economic legislation and its increase in the expansion of 
civil liberties was Roosevelt’s ability to finally make an appointment to the Supreme 
Court at the beginning of the 1937 term. This chapter will be divided into two sections.  
The first section will discuss the activism that is related to the New Deal legislation and 
the second will discuss civil liberty issues that were dealt with by the Hughes Court.  This 
chapter concludes by pointing out flaws in the traditional characterization of judicial 
activism.
48
 
                                                          
47
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 In 1936, Roosevelt was re-elected by historic margins winning forty-seven out of 
forty-nine states and over sixty percent of the popular vote.
49
  In February 1937, during 
the wake of his re-election victory, Roosevelt introduced a plan that was presented as a 
way to aid the older justices in their duties on the Court.  Critics of the plan charged it 
was an attempt by Roosevelt to “pack” the Court with justices who would uphold the 
constitutionality of his legislation.
50
 
In March 1937, the Supreme Court upheld a state minimum wage law for women, 
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, which seemed to be a reversal from a decision the 
Court had rendered only a few months prior when it struck down a similar state minimum 
wage law, in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo.  Of great importance to the West 
Coast Hotel decision was the fact that Justice Owen Roberts changed his vote to uphold 
the state minimum wage law when only a few months before, he had voted against an 
almost seemingly identical law in Morehead.  After West Coast Hotel Co., during the 
final months of the term, the Court upheld the constitutionality of all the New Deal 
legislation that came before it.  Subsequently, scholars noted that Justice Roberts 
switched from voting with the four conservative members on the Court in striking down 
New Deal legislation to upholding New Deal legislation reasoning that he had acquiesced 
to political pressure that had been incurred as a result of the 1936 presidential election 
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and Roosevelt’s court-packing plan in order to preserve the Supreme Court as an 
institution.
51
 
In 1947, almost ten years after the switch in time, Schlesinger published an article 
in Fortune magazine which introduced the concept of “judicial activism” for the first 
time.
52
  In 2004, Kmiec wrote of the article that “Schlesinger fails to define his terms 
with precision… Schlesinger never explains what characteristics would make a decision 
‘activist.’”53  While it is true that Schlesinger did not explicitly define what activism was, 
one is able to infer the characteristics of an activist judge or activist court when 
understood through the paradigm of the Yale’s thesis.54  Schlesinger wrote: 
“The Yale’s thesis, crudely put, is that any judge chooses his results and reasons 
backward.  The resources of legal artifice, the ambiguity of precedents, the range 
of applicable doctrine, are all so extensive that in most cases in which there is a 
reasonable difference of opinion a judge can come out on either side without 
straining the fabric of legal logic. A naïve judge does this unconsciously and 
conceives himself to be an objective interpreter of the law.  A wise judge knows 
that political choice is inevitable; he makes no false pretense of objectivity and 
consciously exercises the judicial power with an eye to social results… The Yale 
school believes that the liberal case against the 1936 Court was based on a false 
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and naïve issue.  The proper criticism should have been, not that the old Court 
indulged in judicial legislation.  The Court cannot escape politics: therefore, let it 
use its political power for wholesome social purposes.  Conservative majorities in 
past courts have always legislated in the interests of business community: why 
should a liberal majority tie its hands by a policy of self-denial (self-restraint) that 
conservatism will never follow when it is in power?... Where the old Court (pre-
switch in time) tended to strike down state and feral measures of liberal economic 
regulation and to sustain state and federal measures of personal regulation, the 
Black-Douglas (activist) group tends to sustain liberal economic regulation and 
strike down law affecting personal liberties… Black, for example, will invoke 
deference to the legislature when it does something he supports; or Frankfurter (a 
proponent of self-restraint) will strike down laws when such action is within the 
well-established limitation of the Court.”55 
From this segment, it is clear that Schlesinger thought activism – whether perpetrated by 
the Court or a judge – was something that conservatives and liberals did.  Furthermore, 
activism is neither a positive nor negative thing.  While Schlesinger preferred liberal 
activism to conservative activism, he thought it was simply a by-product of adjudication.  
It can also be deduced from this article that Schlesinger thought activism occurred when a 
judge or a court actively advanced a cause or ideology.  If legislation supported the cause 
of an activist judge he would defer to it.  Likewise, if legislation offends an advocate of 
self-restraint, he would render it unconstitutional.  In essence, all courts and judges are 
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activist.  The only difference between an activist judge and a judge who purported to 
defer to legislatures was that the activist judge is cognizant enough of his power to use it 
for a cause he believed in, whereas, the self-restraint judge – unbeknownst to him – 
would ultimately do the same; he was just not smart enough to recognize it. 
 Bork disagreed with Schlesinger’s cynical depiction of all judges as being 
political actors insofar as they reach their decision and then reason backwards.  Even 
though Bork, who was instrumental in the formulation of originalism, disagreed with 
Schlesinger he wrote “Any lawyer or judge who is honest with himself knows that he 
often intuits a conclusion then goes to work to see if legal reasoning supports it. But the 
original intuition arises out of long familiarity with the structure and process of law.”56  
One is forced to ask if there is any substantial difference between the characterization of 
the adjudication processes that are presented by Bork and Schlesinger. 
In the 1980’s, the nomination of Bork to the Supreme Court brought the ideas of 
originalism under close scrutiny. Schlesinger and Bork may have disagreed about what 
judicial activism was as well as its potential consequences in American democracy, 
however, it is clear both men agreed that the Hughes Court was fundamental in shaping 
the consciousness of the people regarding what can and should be defined as activism.
57
 
Furthermore, both men agreed that the switch in time of 1937 served as a watershed mark 
in constitutional law.  For Schlesinger, the Supreme Court ceased the obstructionism 
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which was preventing economic progress.
58
 On the other hand, Bork observed that the 
Supreme Court simply abandoned the protection of federalism at that time.
59
   While 
Whittington stated that originalism was born as a reactive philosophy to activism of the 
Warren Court,
60
 Keck wrote, “(t)hough modern judicial conservatism has roots that reach 
back to the adoption of the original Constitution, its principal lines of development began 
with the founding moment of modern constitutional law, the New Deal ‘switch in time’ 
of 1937.”61   
New scholarship concerning the Supreme Court and New Deal legislation by 
Barry Cushman and G. Edward White has questioned the traditional narrative of the 
switch in time.  White argued that institutionally, doctrinal changes had been altering the 
way the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution from the beginning of the twentieth 
century.  What occurred during the New Deal was simply an extension of the transpiring 
changes.  In addition to doctrinal changes, administrative agencies and law had 
commenced and expanded prior to the New Deal.
62
  Cushman, however, asserted that it 
was the evisceration of the public/private distinction in Nebbia v. New York that paved 
the way for the Supreme Court to eventually uphold the New Deal legislation.  For 
Cushman, Justice Roberts ironically played a pivotal role in establishing the 
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constitutionality of New Deal legislation not because of his switch in time vote rather it 
was because he wrote the majority opinion in Nebbia.
63
 The notion that the switch in time 
narrative could be flawed has the potential of having serious consequences for scholars 
who are interested in studying both the history of the struggle between the President and 
Supreme Court during the New Deal and those who study judicial activism.  
Economic Regulation and New Deal Legislation 
 Economic regulation during the New Deal can be divided into two distinct 
categories: State and Federal.  The New Deal legislation was a series of acts passed by 
the United States Congress in an attempt to fix the devastating consequences of the Great 
Depression.  While Congress was trying to find remedies for the economic realities the 
American people were facing, many states were also experimenting with new, innovative 
ways they could possibly provide relief to the citizens of their states.  Shortly after 
Congress began passing its New Deal legislation, Constitutional challenges to some of 
the state laws began to find their way to the Supreme Court and Congress, along with the 
President, watched in anticipation as to how the Court might rule. 
State Statutes 
 In 1934, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a law that had been 
passed in Minnesota during an effort to grant relief to its citizens who were facing 
foreclosures which had been increasing as a result of the Great Depression.  One of the 
mortgage companies in Minnesota sued claiming that the law violated the Article I 
section 10, the contracts clause, as well as the due process and equal protection clauses of 
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the fourteenth amendment.  When the Court issued its ruling in Home Building & Loan 
Association v. Blaisdell, Chief Justice Hughes, in a five to four decision, wrote for the 
majority that “The contract clause of the Federal Constitution is not a specific, 
particularized, absolute, or unqualified prohibition, to be read with literal exactness like a 
mathematical formula, although associated in the same section with more specific 
prohibitions, but is general, affording a broad outline and requiring construction to fill in 
the details.”64  Hughes further recognized that the statute was a “reasonable and valid 
exercise of the state's reserved power to protect the vital interests of the public during the 
emergency, and does not violate the contract clause of the Federal Constitution.”65  
Blaisdell gave those who hoped the New Deal would withstand judicial scrutiny a sense 
of optimism because only two years earlier the Court had struck down an Oklahoma 
statute – which had been passed prior to the Great Depression – requiring ice sellers, 
manufactures or distributors to obtain a state permit.  The Court, in this case, did not 
recognize the regulation of ice to any “such relation to the public as to warrant its 
inclusion in the category of businesses charged with a public use.”66  In Blaisdell, the 
Court seemed to be acknowledging the economic realities of the depression while 
realizing that it might be necessary to constitute emergency measures to provide relief to 
the people and fix the economic problems. 
 Later in 1934, the Court once again upheld a state statute that permitted New 
York to fix retail prices for milk.  In Nebbia v. New York, the five to four majority – with 
                                                          
64
 Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) 
65
 Ibid 
66
 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) 
 28 
 
the majority opinion written by Justice Roberts – ruled that the statute did not violate the 
equal protection or due process clauses of the Constitution.  Roberts stated that “Under 
the American form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are 
normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall 
be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are 
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the 
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally 
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common 
interest.”67  Not only did Roberts further the concept that contracts were not absolute, in 
keeping with Blaisdell, he introduced the idea that businesses – long thought to be in the 
private sphere – could have an effect on the public at large, and – as such – this meant 
that the state could regulate them in order to protect the public.
68
   
The optimism of those who believe in the New Deal was further sustained with 
Nebbia.
69
  The same year Nebbia was decided, Alpheus Thomas Mason wrote an article 
where he asserted the Supreme Court had not abdicated in its duty to determine whether 
or not legislation was indeed constitutional.  Mason contended: 
“It was not the provisions of the Constitution, not the foundations of the fathers, 
that were being overthrown in the recent Nebbia and Blaisdell cases but only the 
then dissenting view of what constitutes sound economic social policy… As 
                                                          
67
 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) 
68
 Cushman, pp. 154-155 
69
 Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M. The Age of Roosevelt: the Politics of Upheaval 1935-1936. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1960: 254.;  Mason, Alpheus Thomas. “Has the Supreme Court Abdicated.” The North 
American Review, 1934: 353. 
 29 
 
Justice Roberts’s opinion indicates, the court may relinquish for a time its self-
made role as arbiter of State and national legislative policies, and this will be all 
to the good.  But why think, as certain commentators do, that these 1934 decisions 
will make it difficult for the Court to recover the ground it has relinquished, or 
that judicial review will fall into innocuous desuetude?”70 
In January 1936, a time when federal New Deal legislation was being struck down, 
Howard Lee McBain, who was the Ruggles Professor of Constitutional Law at Columbia 
University, argued with some – but not total – accuracy that both the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act and the Tennessee Valley Authority would be upheld.
71
  In 2007, 
William G. Ross noted during 1930-1934 of Chief Justice Hughe’s tenure “the Court was 
more deferential toward regulatory legislation than at any time since his previous tenure 
on the Court.”72 
Federal Statutes 
 In January 1935, the Court ruled that Title I of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act of 1933 was unconstitutional.  The NIRA had allowed President Franklin Roosevelt 
to set forth regulations for the production of petroleum products at various phases.  It 
further allowed him to prosecute those who had violated those regulations. In an eight to 
one decision – Justice Cardozo was the lone dissenter – the Court ruled, in Panama 
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Refining Co. v. Ryan, when Congress gave the president this power, it violated the non-
delegation doctrine.
73
  The Court asserted: 
 “As to the transportation of oil production in excess of state permission, Congress 
had declared no policy, had established no standard, and had laid down no rule.  
There was no requirement or definition of circumstances and conditions in which 
the transportation of petroleum was to be allowed or prohibited.  Furthermore, the 
Court found another objection to the validity of prohibition laid down by 
executive orders… in that the executive orders contained no finding or statement 
of the grounds of the President’s action in enacting the prohibition.”74  
In other words, the language in the law was vague.  At a press conference following the 
decision, President Roosevelt stated, “You and I know that in the long rung there may be 
half a dozen more court decisions before they get the correct language, before they get 
things straightened out according to correct constitutional methods.”75  One should note, 
however, that both Schlesinger and Malcolm Sharp contended that this was the first time 
the non-delegation doctrine had been invoked.
76
 
 A few weeks later the Roosevelt administration was relieved when the Court, in a  
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series of cases collectively known as the Gold Clause Cases,
77
 upheld, in a five to four  
decision, both the acts of Congress and an executive order which attempted to stabilize 
the banking system and currency.
78
  These actions “voided the clauses in public and 
private bonds pledging redemption in gold; instead, all obligations were declared 
dischargeable in legal tender currency.”79  Bondholders saw a loss in their original 
investment and challenged the constitutionality of these acts.  Had the Court overturned 
the acts “the public debt would (have) instantly increase(d) by $10 billion, and the total 
debt of the country, by nearly $70 billion.”80  Furthermore, Congress would have lost the 
ability to regulate currency.   
 In May 1935, the Court heard a challenge to the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934.  
Although this particular act was not part of the New Deal, Congress attempted to use the 
commerce clause to force railroad companies to provide pensions and disability insurance 
to their employees.  In Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., the Court ruled 
– in a five to four decision – that Congress had overstepped its prescribed boundaries, 
regarding interstate commerce and, in the process of doing so, had unfairly deprived the 
railroad companies their right to due process.  Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the 
split Court: 
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“The federal government is one of enumerated powers; those not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to 
the states or to the people. The Constitution is not a statute, but the supreme law 
of the land to which all statutes must conform, and the powers conferred upon the 
federal government are to be reasonably and fairly construed, with a view to 
effectuating their purposes. But recognition of this principle can not justify 
attempted exercise of a power clearly beyond the true purpose of the grant. Const. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 3, confers power on the Congress to regulate commerce among the 
several states; and that this power must be exercised in subjection to the guarantee 
of due process of law found in U.S. Const. amend. V.”81 
Clearly, the Court did not seem to be in position to allow Congress to use its powers 
under interstate commerce in a broad way.  One would have been wise to view this as a 
foreshadowing of events to come. 
 Some twenty-one days later, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled both the 
Frazier-Lemke Act and – once again – a portion of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
of 1933 were unconstitutional.  In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, the Court 
ruled that the mortgage moratorium in the Frazier-Lemke Act violated the Fifth 
Amendment by essentially not granting fair compensation in taking property.
82
  In 
Blaisdell, Minnesota – in an economic emergency – temporarily allowed home buyers 
who had fallen behind to pay rent on their mortgages, however, this was not considered 
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to be a permanent solution. Furthermore, the Minnesota law did not affect the value of 
the mortgage.  Conversely, the Frazier-Lemke Act essentially lowered the mortgage 
value of a home, to an occupant who had filed for bankruptcy, without compensating the 
holder of the mortgage for the difference in price.  In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corporation v. United States, the Court again ruled that Congress had violated the non-
delegation doctrine and exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause. 
 In January 1936, the Court held that provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1933, which paid farmers with revenues collected from taxes not to grow certain 
crops with the hopes of increasing the prices, was unconstitutional. The AAA had derived 
its authority from the commerce clause.  In United States v. Butler, Justice Roberts – 
delivering an opinion for a six to three majority – asserted that Congress did have the 
authority to collect taxes, however, there were some restrictions to this power. Of great 
interest, Roberts wrote, “The power conferred by Article 1, 8, clause 1, of the Federal 
Constitution to lay and spend taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United 
States, is not restricted to the enumerated legislative fields committed to Congress by the 
other provisions of the article, but confers a substantive power to tax and appropriate, 
limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general 
welfare of the United States.”83 Ultimately, the act was unconstitutional because it 
violated the Tenth Amendment.  Roberts declared, “The tax, the appropriation of the 
funds raised, and the direction for their disbursement, were possibly permissible means to 
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an unconstitutional end.”84  While the AAA was ruled unconstitutional, it is fascinating 
that the Court recognized that Congress did have the authority to provide for the general 
welfare and that authority extended beyond the written text of the Constitution. 
 Roosevelt eventually found success in the Supreme Court with the Tennessee 
Valley Authority.  Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority is a peculiar case.  The 
Court, in a plurality opinion, ultimately decided that Congress was acting within its 
authority when it created the TVA thus avoiding the Constitutional issues that were 
presented by the plaintiffs in the case.
85
  This might not have been the most resounding 
victory for the New Deal, but it was a victory nonetheless. 
 In May 1936, the Court ruled that Congress had exceeded its authority under the 
commerce clause in the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935.  The act was not 
coercive and attempted to incentivize fair competition and labor practices among coal 
producers by providing substantial tax breaks. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co. – a five to 
three decision – the Court asserted that there existed a distinction between production and 
commerce and that production was something that occurred in local industry.  As a result, 
it was out of the regulatory reach of Congress.  Chief Justice Hughes agreed with this 
distinction and sided with the majority in that endeavor, however, he went on to declare 
that Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce in order to produce fair  
 
                                                          
84
 Ibid 
85
 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) 
 35 
 
competition was plenary.
86
  
Approaching the “Switch in Time” 
 From 1930-1937, the Supreme Court overturned fourteen federal statutes.
87
  
Eleven of those fourteen were overturned in one term, 1935-1936.
88
  One can easily 
understand why Roosevelt was willing to take what some considered extreme measures 
in order to ensure the viability of the New Deal.
89
  In June 1936, the Court ruled – in a 
five to four decision – that a New York minimum wage law, which only applied to 
women, was unconstitutional.
90
  In March 1937, in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, the 
Court ruled – in another five to four decisions – that a Washington minimum wage law, 
which only applied to women and seemed to be identical to the New York law that had 
just been struck down, was constitutional.
91
  While West Coast Hotel was a decision that 
effected state legislation, the Court went on to uphold the constitutionality of New Deal 
legislation in four cases before the end of the 1936-1937 term.
92
 After the switch in time, 
the Supreme Court thwarted all remaining challenges to New Deal legislation and it was 
allowed to stand.
93
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 There are a few reasons why the conventional narrative, when applied to 
economic legislation and the switch in time, is flawed.  First, Justice Roberts was a 
“swing voter” before West Coast Hotel.  He voted with the majority in five to four 
decisions as well as with what one might call the liberal justices in Blaisdell, Nebbia, the 
Gold Clause Cases, and Ashwander v. TVA.  All of these cases recognized the need for an 
expanded role in government.  He did vote, in five to four decision, with the conservative 
members of the Court – and against the New Deal – in Morehead, Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Alton Railway Co., and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.  In Schechter and Raford the 
Court unanimously voted against the New Deal.  Is it possible that some of the New Deal 
really was just bad legislation?  Second, implicit in the switch in time narrative is the 
argument that the Court was divided ideologically and that a single justice switching his 
vote had major implications.
94
 It has already been shown that in Schechter and Radford 
there was no ideological divide.  Additionally, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, Roberts 
voted with the eight to one majority and, in United States v. Butler, Roberts voted with 
the six to three majority.  Both cases overturned provisions of the New Deal but the 
outcome of either case would not have changed if Roberts’s vote would have been 
different.  Furthermore, in two of the four cases decided after West Coast Hotel, the 
majorities that Roberts voted with were six to three
95
 and seven to two.
96
  Even in post-
switch in time America, a single Justice changing his vote would not have made a 
difference.  Finally, and probably the best evidence against the switch in time narrative, 
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Justice Roberts wrote a memorandum explaining that not only was his vote not swayed 
by the court packing plan in West Coast Hotel but his decision in this case was given 
before Roosevelt even introduced the his plan.  Furthermore, the reason he voted for the 
minimum wage law to prevail, in West Coast Hotel, where his vote had seemed markedly 
different in Morehead was because the counsel representing the defendant in West Coast 
Hotel had asked the Court to overrule the precedent governing minimum wage laws for 
women at that time whereas the counsel in Morehead had not done so.
97
   
 The Hughes Court has been regarded as an activist court because of the decisions 
it rendered before the switch in time.  However, the section of this chapter shows many of 
the decisions that overturned New Deal legislation were not solely based on an 
ideological divide.  In fact, in some of these cases there was no ideological divide 
present.  Schlesinger’s characterization of an activist Hughes Court rests on the notion 
that it was a conservative court protecting conservative interests such as property rights.  
The absence of an absolute ideological split, the presence of a swing voter, in Justice 
Roberts, and changing constitutional doctrines implies that there was no real judicial 
activism occurring on the Hughes Court in regards to economic regulation.   
When a claim of judicial activism is made against the Court, inherent in that claim 
is the idea that the Court was only concerned with promoting a certain outcome.
98
 The 
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conventional switch in time narrative along with Schlesinger’s depiction of an activist 
Hughes Court fails to recognize that the pre-switch in time Court found itself in a 
turbulent time in American history.  What can really be seen as occurring during the 
Hughes Court was an internal struggle as to how the Court should react to legislation that 
was passed during a national emergency. While some members of the Court might have 
been concerned with preserving the status quo, it was certainly not all members.  This 
was the whole reason Justice Roberts left the memorandum to Justice Frankfurter almost 
two decades after the West Coast Hotel.  Justice Roberts wanted the readers of the 
memorandum to understand that he sought out the correct interpretation of the 
Constitution based on what was presented before the Court and not the correct outcome.  
In other words, his decisions were rendered based on how he interpreted cases that were 
presented to the Court and were not rendered based on an outcome he thought the 
Constitution ought to provide for.  
Civil Liberties, Expansion of Criminal Procedure Protections,
99
 and the Beginning 
of Civil Rights 
 As previously mentioned, Schlesinger regarded the pre-switch in time Court as 
one that had little regard for personal liberties whereas Bork characterized the switch in 
time as the Court moving from protecting economic liberties to – afterwards – protecting 
civil liberties.  Either way, the implication is clear. Before 1937, the Court was not 
generally concerned about personal, non-economic freedoms.  However, the Court had 
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already begun to turn its focus towards civil liberties before the tenure of the Hughes 
Court. 
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, prior to the Hughes Court, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that there could be a relationship “between Fourteenth Amendment 
due process and the Bill of Rights…”100  In 1923, the Court used the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down a “law that infringed on noneconomic 
liberties”101 for the first time.102  Two years later, the Court asserted, in Gitlow v. New 
York, that it “Assumed, for the purposes of the case, that freedom of speech and of the 
press are among the personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”103  Finally, in 1927, the 
Court used the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to overturn “a 
conviction under Kansas’s syndicalism statute… without mentioning freedom of speech 
or the press.” 104  The Court also did not mention freedom of association, but its presence 
can be felt in the opinion.
105
 
Freedom of Speech 
 The Hughes Court commenced its expansion of civil liberties, starting with the 
First Amendment’s freedom of speech, almost from its inception.  There were, at least, 
three incorporation cases regarding the First Amendment that can be attributed to the 
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Hughes Court.  In 1931, the Court “… formally incorporated… the First Amendment’s 
guaranty of freedom of the press”106 with Near v. Minnesota. Six year later, in DeJonge 
v. Oregon, the Court incorporated the “fundamental constitutional rights of free speech 
and peaceable assembly… (under) the  due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”107  The last incorporation case to be presided over by the Hughes Court 
regarding the First Amendment was Cantwell v. Connecticut which used the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply the free exercise of the religion clause to 
the states.
108
 
 While the incorporation cases are of the utmost importance, the Court was 
simultaneously showing its support for the First Amendment in other ways.  In 1931, a 
conviction under a California statute, which banned the public display of red flags, was 
reversed because “it could be construed to prohibit peaceful and orderly opposition to 
government by legal means.”109 The majority opinion stated “the conception of liberty 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces freedom of 
speech.”110  The Court continued to overturn the convictions of people who had been 
prosecuted in violation of legislation by cities and various states.   A conviction under a 
Georgia statute was voided because it violated the defendants “rights to free speech and 
assembly…”111 Later, the Court further applied freedom of speech and assembly to the 
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states through the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
112
  
The facts of labor disputes
113
 and peaceful labor protests
114
 were also shown to be 
protected speech. 
Criminal Convictions and Juries 
 There were two important incorporation decisions originating from concerns over 
criminal protections that were rendered under the Hughes Court.  In 1932, the Supreme 
Court effectively incorporated the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel in criminal cases 
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with Powell v. Alabama.  
Five years later, in Palko v. Connecticut, the Court was asked to incorporate the Fifth 
Amendment’s double jeopardy clause through the Privileges and Immunities clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Ultimately, the Court declined to incorporate the Fifth 
Amendment, but it did state that the amendments could be selectively incorporated.
115
  
The next year, the Court ruled, in Johnson v. Zerbst, indigent criminal defendants in 
federal cases were required by the Sixth Amendment to be provided with counsel.  While 
this was not an incorporation case, it shows that the Hughes Court was willing to enforce 
criminal protections at all levels. 
In Brown v. Mississippi, the Court relied on a “general theory of due process”116 
to overturn the convictions of three people whose confessions were coerced.
117
 This was 
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the first time “the Court struck down a state criminal conviction on the basis of coerced 
confession.”118  Later, it explicitly used the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to reverse the convictions of defendants who had been coerced.
119
  The 
Court again relied on due process to later rule that confessions contained through 
coercion could not be used against the accused in capital cases.
120
  In all cases mentioned 
here, when the Court overturned confessions based on coercion, the persons accused 
where African American men. 
Another way states ensured guilty verdicts against blacks was to prohibit them 
from serving on juries.  In 1935, the Court ruled that the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the exclusion of African Americans from serving on 
juries solely on the basis of race.
121
  In Hale v. Kentucky, “… the Court found a 
presumption of denial of equal protection insofar as no black had served on the local jury 
since at least 1960 and all members of the jury wheel were white even though seven 
hundred blacks were qualified for jury service.”122  The next year, a murder indictment 
against a black defendant was dismissed because no black person had served on a jury for 
forty years even though they comprised approximately half of the population.
123
  Finally, 
in Smith v. Texas, the Court declared that the“…Fourteenth amendment prohibits… racial 
discrimination on grand juries in the selection of grand juries... If there has been 
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discrimination, whether accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously, the conviction cannot 
stand.”124  Ross has argued that the Hughes Court used due process in criminal 
proceedings to help expand rights of southern blacks who often found themselves at the 
mercy of a corrupt legal system.
125
 
Voting 
 While not necessarily substantial, the Hughes Court also expanded voting rights 
in some minor ways. In 1932, the Court found that Texas state officials had violated the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when they refused to allow African 
Americans to vote in the Democratic Primary.
126
 Three years later, the Court ruled that 
political parties could prohibit blacks from primaries as long as it was not doing so 
because of state legislation.
127
 An Oklahoma statute concerning voter registration was 
found to be in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, due to its grandfather clause, and 
was rendered unconstitutional.
128
 
Separate but Equal and the Protection of Minorities 
 Finally, the Hughes Court set precedents which would not only end segregation in 
schools but would also establish the Supreme Court as an institutional protector of 
minorities. In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, the Court ruled that Missouri was 
obliged to provide its black citizens an education, in this case specifically a legal 
education, within its jurisdiction if it had also provided the same education to its white 
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citizens.  Furthermore, if only one school existed to provide the education that was 
sought, the school could not segregate; it would be compelled to admit people from all 
races.  Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, asserted: 
“The equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. 
Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the protection of equal laws can be 
performed only where its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction. It is 
there that the equality of legal right must be maintained. That obligation is 
imposed by the United States Constitution upon the states severally as 
governmental entities -- each responsible for its own laws establishing the rights 
and duties of persons within its borders. It is an obligation the burden of which 
cannot be cast by one state upon another, and no state can be excused from 
performance by what another state may do or fail to do. That separate 
responsibility of each state within its own sphere is of the essence of statehood 
maintained under the dual system of government. It is impossible to conclude that 
what otherwise would be an unconstitutional discrimination, with respect to the 
legal right to the enjoyment of opportunities within the State, can be justified by 
requiring resort to opportunities elsewhere. That resort may mitigate the 
inconvenience of the discrimination but cannot serve to validate it.”129 
In this decision, Hughes is not overturning separate but equal, rather, he is enforcing it 
with two caveats.  First, the Court is stating that in the absence of a separate facility 
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within a state’s jurisdiction, integration must occur.  Second, and maybe more important, 
a shift seems to be occurring regarding the concept of separate but equal.  It appears that 
separate but equal is transforming into separate and equal.  The word “but” is 
exclusionary.  Implicit in separate but equal is the notion that the state can segregate 
certain people – “those people” – from society so long as they were being sent to a 
facility that was equal to facilities in white society.  However, “and” is an inclusive term 
that changes the status of minorities from being “those people” to becoming citizens.130  
In Plessy v. Ferguson the court made a distinction between social and political equality 
when it declared: 
“If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of 
natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits, and a voluntary 
consent of individuals. This end can neither be accomplished nor promoted by 
laws that conflict with the general sentiment of the community upon whom they 
are designed to operate… Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or 
to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so 
can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation... If one race 
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be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put 
them upon the same plane.”131 
In other words, the Court, in 1896, was willing to indulge discriminatory acts passed by 
state legislatures as long as the discriminatory sentiment was shared by the public it 
represented.  Conversely, in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, which was decided over 
forty years after Plessy, the Court signaled that the state had an obligation to treat all of 
its citizens equally, with respect to access of facilities in its jurisdiction, regardless of 
public feelings on the subject.
132
  One can also see the move from separate but equal to 
separate and equal in the social/political equality distinction.  Plessy basically ruled that 
states could treat blacks as “politically equal” but “socially unequal” whereas Hughes 
contended that states had to treat blacks – regardless of citizenship – as “politically” and 
“socially equal.” 
Furthermore, Plessy did not define what the “equal” in separate but equal meant.  
Did it mean equality of safety? Equality of the number of seats in railroad cars? Equality 
of comfort?  However, the Hughes Court pushed for equality of access. In requiring 
access to facilities the Hughes Court was also raising the idea of equality, in separate but 
equal, to a standard that would become increasingly difficult for the states to maintain.
133
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 The same year the Court decided Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, it also 
decided United States v. Carolene Products Company.  Carolene Products is a decision 
that would have normally been relegated to the economic sphere of New Deal legislation 
had it not been for footnote four where the Court simultaneously deferred to the 
expansion of the regulatory state which derived its authority from the commerce clause 
but then stated that it would not necessarily be as deferential towards legislation that dealt 
with “discrete and insular minorities.”134  Carolene Products essentially set the precedent 
for the justification of expanding civil rights in cases that would come before the 
Supreme Court in later years.
135
 
While it is true that the protection of civil liberties increased after the switch in 
time, to suggest that is it was not occurring before then is false.  The pre-switch in time 
Court – the “conservative” court – was more protective of economic rights than civil 
liberties, but was expanding those liberties nonetheless.  At the end of the 1936-1937 
term, Justice VanDevanter – one of the conservative justices who had faithfully 
obstructed the New Deal – retired.136  Roosevelt was able, at that time, to slowly start to 
remake the Court in a way that would be more deferential, so that by 1941, Roosevelt had  
                                                          
134
 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)  
135
 Cover, Robert M. “The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities.” The Yale Law 
Journal, 1982: 1287-1316. 
136
 Kalman argued that the retirement of Justice Van Devanter could have been induced by the court 
packing plan, so that even if the court packing plan did not cause the switch in time, it was still 
successful because it persuaded Van Devanter to retire. 
 48 
 
replaced all of the Four Horsemen.
137
 This resulted in a Supreme Court that was more 
deferential to Congress, in regards to national legislation, and less deferential towards 
state legislation which is evidenced by the fact that from 1938 to 1953 the Court only 
overturned three federal laws while overturning 108 state laws.
138
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CHAPTER III 
THE WARREN COURT, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND ORIGINALISM 
The judicial activism at issue with the Hughes Court dealt with the Court 
continuously holding that the regulatory state was unconstitutional.  In other words, the 
Hughes Court was considered an activist court because it sided with business interests 
and against the government in the its quest to bring about economic progress.  However, 
the Warren Court was perceived as an activist court for a completely different reason and, 
unlike the New Deal – Hughes – Court, the Chief Justice himself was personally targeted 
for criticism.   
Almost immediately, the Warren Court faced criticism over its decisions because 
of its use of the Fourteenth Amendment to end discriminatory practices that were 
conducted by the various states; thus, enlarging civil rights and civil liberties protections 
in the midst of the Civil Rights Movement.
139
  Additionally, some scholars – fearing an 
unconstrained Supreme Court – began a search for “neutral principles” that could serve 
as a guide when the Court was determining who was worthy of its protection.
140
  Out of 
this search for neutral principles, originalism emerged.  
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Originalism was a critic of the Warren Court and eventually provided a counter 
method of jurisprudential interpretation.
141
  Originalist critics charged that the Warren 
Court’s method of jurisprudential interpretation was concerned with creating desirable or 
preferred outcomes.
142
  Essentially, originalists declared that the Supreme Court should 
have been more concerned with the process of interpretation rather than the outcome of 
interpretation.   
Earl Warren and his court were not activists for expanding protections of the Bill 
of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment because this was a practice that had 
commenced before Warren’s tenure as Chief Justice. Furthermore, the notion that 
originalism could fix the problems of constitutional interpretation Warren’s critics claim 
were present during the Warren Court is a misnomer because originalism has the 
potential to produce decisions that create desired outcomes as well.
143
 This chapter will 
discuss the events in Earl Warren’s life that led to his nomination as Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court and landmark cases that were heard during his tenure.  It will then look at 
the way in which originalism has critiqued the Warren Court as well as its potential as a 
jurisprudential theory and the problems associated with it. This chapter will conclude by 
revealing that notions of equality and fairness in the United States would be much 
                                                          
141
 Whittington, “The New Originalism,” 101-119.; Bork, p. 143-160. 
142
 This was Schlesinger’s characterization of judicial activism.  However, he described activism as a by-
product of adjudication and not as something that was done with malicious intent which is how 
originalists describe it. 
143
 Originalists argued that the Warren Court substituted their own policy preferences at either the 
expense of democratic majorities at the state level – hence the obsession with federalism – or 
principles established in the Constitution by the Founders.  These ideas will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
 51 
 
different today had Warren employed an originalist interpretive method while Chief 
Justice. 
Public Life before the Supreme Court 
Earl Warren had many public roles.  He worked for the Judiciary Committee in 
the California state legislature.  He was elected and served California as a District 
Attorney, Attorney General, and – his last position as a publicly elected official – 
Governor.  Arguably, his most notable role in American history was served as Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 In 1948, Warren ran as the Republican Vice-Presidential Candidate with New 
York Governor Thomas Dewey.  That year, President Truman won re-election.  When 
Warren went back to California, he found that his presidential campaign offices had 
closed “two weeks before the election.”144 When Warren asked why the California 
campaign staff had chosen to close the offices, before the election, he was told, “there 
was nothing to fight… the Democrats had no campaign organization… and the 
Republicans would not contribute any more money toward a foregone conclusion.”145   
In 1950, Warren ran for and won a third term as governor.   In 1952, Warren 
announced he would seek the Republic nomination for the office of the presidency.  
Warren ceased his campaign for the nomination during the convention when it became 
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apparent that General Dwight Eisenhower would win.  Warren congratulated Eisenhower 
and returned to California.
146
   
Eisenhower went on to win the presidency that year.  Before his inauguration, in 
December 1952, Eisenhower called Warren to inform him that he did not have a cabinet 
position available for him. Warren told Eisenhower that was fine as he did not want a 
cabinet position.  Eisenhower then personally committed to offering Warren “the first 
vacancy on the Supreme Court.”147  
 On December 9, 1952, with Chief Justice Fred Vinson presiding, the Supreme 
Court heard oral arguments in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka et al.
148
 South 
Carolina, Delaware and Virginia had similar segregation laws that forbade integrated 
schools on the basis of race.  The petitioners claimed that “segregation… in public 
schools… solely on the basis of race” denied African American children “equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment...”149 
 When the Justices were first able to discuss the case on December 13, 1952, 
Vinson signaled that he was not ready to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson.
150
  As deliberations 
continued among the Justices, it became clear that there was a good chance Brown would 
be a five to four decision with Justices Black, Douglas, Burton, Minton, and Frankfurter 
wanting to overturn Plessy and Justices Vinson, Reed, Jackson, and Clark wanting to 
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uphold Plessy.
151
  The Justices knew, in a case as controversial as this, a five to four 
decision would have been devastating for the country. 
Justice Frankfurter moved to have the cases reargued in the 1953 term which 
began in October.  Frankfurter hoped that, with some additional time, the Justices who 
were presently dissenting might change their minds.
152
  In September 1953, Chief Justice 
Vinson died.  Justice Frankfurter reportedly told his law clerks, “This is the first 
indication that I have ever had that there is a God.”153  President Eisenhower – true to his 
word – nominated Earl Warren to proceed Vinson. 
Earl Warren as Chief Justice 
Racial Discrimination 
On December 8, 1953, the Court reheard oral arguments.
154
  After oral arguments 
were finished, the Justices met to informally discuss Brown without taking any votes.  
They decided that they would make a ruling in the case that term, but the vote was still 
not unanimous.  The Justices decided to reconvene at a later date so they could have 
some time to work out any issues or concerns they had.
155
   
At noon on May 17, 1954, Chief Justice Earl Warren read the Court’s opinion 
from the bench.  In his rather short opinion, Warren emphasized that it was impossible to 
“turn the clock back to 1868 when the amendment was adopted or even to 1896 when 
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Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”156  He additionally declared that the constitutionality of 
school segregation came down to a single question.  “Does segregation of children in 
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 
‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal 
educational opportunities?”157 The Chief Justice answered, “We believe it does.”158 
Brown unanimously ruled that segregation in public schools, on the basis of race alone, 
was unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.   
While Brown was decided narrowly,
159
 the Warren Court struck down “every 
segregation law challenged before it.
160”  In his memoirs, Warren wrote that the Brown 
decision was the beginning of the term “The Warren Court.”161   
Socio-Economic Discrimination 
 In the 1961 term, Warren’s new law clerks had been instructed by his outgoing 
law clerks to look for a case that involved a person’s right to counsel because “The Chief 
feels strongly that the Constitution requires a lawyer”162 in criminal cases.  During the 
1962 term, the Chief Justice would have his wish granted.  On January 8, 1962, the law 
clerks found a petition from a man by the name of Clarence Gideon.
163
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 Gideon had been convicted in Florida of a felony.  At his trial he, Gideon argued 
that the Sixth Amendment ensured his right to have counsel represent him, though he 
could not afford it.  Gideon was technically wrong.  In 1942, the Supreme Court had 
ruled, in Betts v. Brady, that unless an indigent defendant could show a “special 
circumstance” that would prevent the defendant from obtaining a fair trial in a noncapital 
case, the state was not bound to provide counsel.
164
  Since Gideon’s case was not a 
capital case, he was denied counsel. 
 Eight of the Justices granted Gideon’s petition for certiorari with Justice Clark 
declining.  Before Gideon’s case was tried in the Supreme Court, he wrote to the Court 
with an additional request.  Gideon wanted competent counsel to represent him before the 
highest court in the land.  The Justices acquiesced to this request and asked Abe Fortas, 
who would soon join the Court, if he would represent Gideon.  Fortas agreed, and the 
case was argued on January 15, 1963.
165
 
 On March 18, 1963, Justice Black announced the Court’s unanimous opinion, an 
opinion which he had authored. There was significance in the fact that Justice Black had 
been chosen to write the opinion in this case.  He wrote the dissent in Betts v. Brady.
166
  
The Court ruled that Gideon’s Sixth Amendment rights had been violated.  Indigent 
defendants did have the right to counsel in criminal cases.  Justice Black wrote, 
“…lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with 
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crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some 
countries, but it is in ours.”167 
While Gideon made it clear that defendants had a constitutional right to counsel in 
criminal proceedings, there still remained an important question in Constitutional Law.  
“When does the right to counsel begin?”168  Furthermore, how could an accused person 
exercise their Fifth Amendment right if he was not aware that such a right existed?
169
 
During the 1965 term, the Court sought to answer these questions in Miranda v. Arizona. 
 During oral arguments, Warren pointed out that most states already had clauses in 
their constitutions that protected people from self incrimination.
170
  In his memoirs, 
Warren contended that poor people were disproportionately affected by not knowing they 
had a right to counsel, due to Gideon, as well as a right not to incriminate themselves.   
The Chief Justice postulated that wealthy people would, after being accused of a crime, 
hire an attorney to handle their affairs since they could afford one.  Furthermore, career 
criminals knew their rights.
171
   
The Federal Bureau of Investigation already had a process to warn those who 
were being interrogated.  Why should the states not be required to follow the same 
standard?  Finally, Warren was somewhat appalled by the fact that the states did not give 
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these warnings anyway since he had instructed his staff to give the warnings when he was 
the district attorney.
172
 
On June 13, 1966, the Court gave its decision which had been written by Justice 
Brennan
173
 and was delivered by Chief Justice Warren.
174
  In the five to four decision, the 
Justices ruled that “At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, 
he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain 
silent… The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional 
rule, and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the 
privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the 
defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given.”175  Thus, Miranda’s 
Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination had been violated.  His conviction was 
overturned but, more importantly, this decision required the police, or their agents, to 
inform accused people of their constitutional rights to remain silent and have counsel 
when they were being arrested. 
When Hughes was Chief Justice, the Court extended criminal protection 
procedures as a way to try to stop civil rights abuses that were happening in the south. 
This is why many of the convictions overturned during the Hughes Court involved 
African American men and southern states.  However, the Warren Court understood that 
abuses in the criminal justice system extended to all poor people regardless of race or 
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ethnicity.  In both Gideon and Miranda, the Court recognized that the criminal justice 
system would take advantage of someone based on indigence if the Court allowed it.  
Therefore, landmark decisions that extended protection to people in the criminal justice 
system, under Warren, are better understood through a lens that recognizes poverty as 
one of many ways states will discriminate against their citizens. 
 In Shapiro v. Thompson the Warren Court essentially forbade state governments 
from denying services or funds to poor people based on residency requirements.
176
  This 
case is not typically regarded to the level of the Court’s other landmark cases, however, it 
is still worth mentioning because it demonstrated that the Court was not willing to allow 
the indigence of an individual to be the basis of discrimination in criminal or civil law.  
While the Court was willing to rule that indigent defendants had a right to counsel, it 
never ruled that indigent people had a right to welfare.
177
 The Court simply ruled that if a 
state was giving welfare benefits, it could not use the length of residency as a basis for 
discrimination. 
Mal-Apportionment 
In 1962, the Court ruled, in Baker v. Carr,
178
 that the Congressional Districts in 
the United States House of Representatives had to be equal in population.  Warren wrote 
that he thought this was “the most important case of my tenure on the Court.”179  While 
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the Court had asserted its belief that Congressional Districts at the federal level should be 
equal, there was a principle that had yet to be developed. 
  On November 22, 1963, the Supreme Court was in conference.  The discussion 
centered on a series of mal-apportionment cases regarding state legislatures.  Warren had 
just assigned himself the duty of writing the majority opinion when the Court heard of 
President Kennedy’s assassination.180 The opinion Warren had assigned to himself on 
that fateful day was for Reynolds v. Sims. Reynolds originated in Alabama and called into 
question the constitutionality of the state’s apportionment scheme for its own legislature. 
Of course, Reynolds was not the only mal-apportioned state case the Court had to deal 
with that term.  There were five other states involved which were Colorado, Maryland, 
Delaware, Virginia, and New York.  Warren was concerned that it may appear as though 
the Court had an ongoing campaign against the South if he chose Reynolds as the main 
case.  In the end, the Chief Justice decided that the Reynolds case was void of the 
complexities that plagued the cases from the other states. Reynolds could be used to 
articulate a simple, comprehensive equal apportionment scheme.
181
 
 In an eight to one decision, with Justice Harlan dissenting, the Court ruled that 
Alabama had violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it 
failed to base its representation on the population.
182
  Reynolds went further than Baker in 
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determining that both houses of the state legislature had to be based on population, unlike 
the federal model.
183
 
 In his opinion, Warren wrote, “Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. 
Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.”184  However, 
the most important principle articulated in Reynolds was “one person, one vote.”185  The 
principle of “one person, one vote” finished the work Baker started. 
Unenumerated Rights
186
 
 During the 1964 term, the Court heard arguments for Griswold v. Connecticut.   
Estelle Griswold was the director of a Planned Parenthood clinic in Connecticut.  She 
was arrested and convicted after a doctor working at the clinic, who was also arrested and 
convicted, prescribed contraception and advised married couples concerning the best 
ways to prevent pregnancy.  This practice violated Connecticut’s birth control law.  
Griswold appealed her conviction to the United States Supreme Court where all nine of 
the Justices voted to grant certiorari.
187
  
 Griswold had argued that the law had violated her First Amendment right 
regarding the freedom of association, however some Justices – Black and Stewart – 
disagreed with Griswold’s argument.  Warren assigned the majority opinion to Justice 
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Douglas because he thought Douglas “had expressed the clearest theory upon which the 
Connecticut law might be invalidated”188 which stressed the right of association. 
 Justice Brennan, who had intended to write his own concurring opinion, 
suggested that Douglas make his opinion broader.  Brennan thought the Court should 
declare that the Bill of Rights guaranteed a right of privacy.  When Douglas added 
Brennan’s suggestion, Brennan decided not to write his own concurring opinion.  Warren 
was concerned because he had desired a narrow opinion in this case, so he joined Justice 
Goldberg’s concurring opinion.189    
 When Warren withdrew his support for the Douglas opinion, it left the Griswold 
decision in limbo. A majority of the justices had determined the Connecticut law was 
unconstitutional, however, they were not able to reach a majority regarding a 
constitutional interpretation that would strike down the law.  In other words, the Court 
had reached a plurality decision.  The Chief Justice knew that if a majority could not 
agree upon the same legal basis for overturning the law, it would leave confusion to the 
Griswold decision.  Therefore, Warren ultimately decided to rejoin the Douglas 
opinion.
190
 
 On June 7, 1965, the Court issued a majority decision overturning the Connecticut 
law.  The Court infamously declared “that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
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substance.”191  In essence, the Court ruled certain basic rights, such as the right to 
privacy, existed in the Constitution even if they cannot be found there verbatim. During 
the same 1964 – 1965 term, the Chief Justice was in the majority in every single case.192 
Originalism 
These are just some of the cases that caused originalists to charge the Warren 
Court with judicial activism. While criticism of the Warren Court existed before the 
creation of originalism, other critics – such as Alexander Bickel – did not label the Court 
as an activist court.
193
   A distinction must be made between criticism of the Court and an 
accusation of judicial activism.  It is one thing to question an interpretive method used by 
the Supreme Court as Bickel does.
194
  It is something quite different to accuse the Court 
of judicial activism because an activist label implies – by both Schlesinger and Bork’s 
definitions – that the Court found a way to interpret the Constitution in order to reach a 
pre-determined outcome which conformed to the Justices’ preferences.  
The notion that the Warren Court had rendered extra-constitutional interpretations 
certainly existed before originalism came to prominence. Originalists, though, accused 
the Warren Court of rendering expedient decisions that had no Constitutional basis. 
Originalists then put forward their own plan, originalism, which they purported would 
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force a judge to focus on interpretation instead of reaching his or her desired outcome.  
However, originalism advances a jurisprudential theory that would have the same effect.  
In other words, by employing originalism the Court will inevitably reach an outcome that 
is desirable to originalists.  Mary E. Becker has argued that the Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights “serves the interests of those most like its drafters: relatively elite white men 
who tend to own more than their share of ‘property.’”195 Therefore, an originalist 
interpretation could effectively be used to render the Constitution useless for the vast 
majority of Americans.  
The interpretive method and critiques of the Warren Court associated with 
originalism were brought to the forefront of controversy, in the American public, with the 
nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court by President Reagan.  Bork is closely 
associated with an older form of originalism; one that claims deference to legislatures 
while searching out the intent of the Founders.
196
  However, as originalism itself was 
critiqued, a new originalism, which can be characterized as an affirmative jurisprudence 
that focused on the “… traditional… understandings of the scope of delegated 
powers,”197 emerged. When one examines originalism, however, one can begin to see 
clear problems with it – both old and new – as an interpretive method. 
 Whittington portrayed new originalism as a system that sought to interpret, as 
opposed to construct, the Constitution, while Gillman asserted that new originalism was a 
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return to a more traditional method of interpretation an example of which can be found in 
Justice Sutherland’s dissenting opinion in Blaisdell.198  Regarding how judges ought to 
interpret the Constitution, Whittingon wrote: 
 “… constitutional construction cannot claim merely to discover a preexisting, if 
deeply hidden, meaning within the founding document.  It employs the 
‘imaginative’ vision of politics rather than the ‘discerning wit’ of judicial 
judgment… Interpretation is the translation of the constitutional text into the 
specifically useful formulas within which a given fact situation can be fit.  In 
order to interpret the founding document, it must be taken not simply as 
constituting a nation but as establishing rules for its future governance.  Its history 
within this context is a history of specification, or replacing a relatively sparse 
collection of general terms with a vast corpus of constitutional law… 
Constitutional interpretation is essentially legalistic, but constitutional 
construction is essentially political.”199 
Whittington seemed to assume that the distinction between legalism and politics is an 
easy one to make.
200
  It is interesting that in a work which purports to establish a 
legitimate framework for when judicial review should occur, Whittington never mentions  
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Marbury v. Madison.
201
 
 Another decision Whittington has written about and characterized as political, is 
Dred Scott v. Sandford.
202
  Gillman, however, has noted that both the majority and 
dissenting opinions, in this case, made an appeal to the intent of the Founders.
203
  
Whittington’s assault on the Dred Scott decision was focused, oddly enough, on Chief 
Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland where Marshall, according to 
Whittington, essentially declared a doctrine of judicial supremacy.  Whittington argued 
that the doctrine of judicial supremacy set a legal foundation for a future Supreme Court 
to render the horrific decision in Dred Scott which overturned the Missouri Compromise 
of 1850 and effectively barred Congress from reaching any future compromise over the 
issue of slavery, both its existence and its diffusion into western territories.  Whittington 
maintained that the Court simply should not have gotten involved and left the decision 
regarding the future of slavery to Congress.
204
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When Whittington referred to McCulloch as a political decision, he was implicitly 
arguing that judicial construction occurred.  However, some distinctions must be made 
between McCulloch and Dred Scott. First, in McCulloch, the Court was upholding federal 
law while overturning state law.  The State of Maryland had argued that the creation of a 
national bank was unconstitutional.  The Court sided with the national government and 
stated: 
“The government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its 
sphere of action… The sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the 
national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers 
it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform 
the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people… If the 
end be legitimate, and within the scope of the constitution, all the means which 
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, and which are not 
prohibited, may constitutionally be employed to carry it into effect.”205 
As in Marbury, in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall set up a framework – or a formula 
– that presented a hierarchy of laws and a hierarchy of sovereigns. Additionally, the 
Court appealed to the Constitution – as a written document – to render its decision.  
Finally, the Court signaled that a power does not have to be expressly delegated to the 
federal government in order for the government to erect institutions that benefit the 
American people. 
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 Conversely, in Dred Scott, Chief Justice Roger Taney overturned a federal statute.  
In his decision, Taney appealed to Marshall’s established hierarchy to overturn the 
Missouri Compromise by asserting that it deprived citizens of their Fifth Amendment 
rights by taking property without compensation when it forbade slavery in free territories.  
Taney wrote: 
“The change in public opinion and feeling in relation to the African race, which 
has taken place since the adoption of the Constitution, cannot change its 
construction and meaning, and it… must be construed and administered now 
according to its true meaning and intention when it was formed and adopted… It 
is not the province of the court to… decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy 
or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political 
or law-making power; to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the 
Constitution. The duty of the court is, to interpret the instrument they have 
framed, with the best lights we can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as 
we find it, according to its true intent and meaning when it was adopted… We 
think they (slaves) are not (constituent members of this sovereignty), and that they 
… were not intended to be included, under the word "citizens" in the 
Constitution…”206 
Taney further argued that the Constitution did not expressly delegate to Congress the 
authority to forbid slavery in the western territories.  Taney’s decision – at a minimum – 
undermined Marshall’s framework of national supremacy as presented in McCulloch, and 
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retroactively said that Maryland – at least in principle – was correct in its interpretation of 
delegated constitutional powers.  Furthermore, Taney seemed to be setting up his own 
framework – or formula – to give legitimacy to the law and the lawmakers. However, he 
was really setting up a formula to support the intentions of laws and lawmakers – not the 
laws or the lawmakers themselves.  
 Like the decisions in McCulloch and Dred Scott, Bork’s originalism sets up a 
similar framework and has been described by O’Neill as a “legal positivist theory of law 
with a more formalist approach to adjudication than had been current since the rise of 
legal realism.”207  While the old originalism tried to discern the intent of constitutional 
clauses or amendments, the new originalism claimed that the Founders established certain 
principles in the Constitution when it delegated powers to the national government.  If the 
federal government only used the powers that were delegated to it, it would be - 
according to originalists - less likely to intrude in the affairs of states or pass legislation 
that could potentially harm property owners. While it is certainly true that the 
Constitution establishes federalism and protects private property, it does not say to what 
degree federalism exists nor does it say that private property rights are absolute.  
Therefore, it is not always clear where federal power ends and state power begins.  When   
new orginialists established fixed boundaries for the federal government which are not 
present in the Constitution they did so based on what they thought the Founders wanted 
those boundaries to be.  Therefore, labeling any type of originalism as being a “legal 
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positivist theory of law with a more formalist approach to adjudication” is somewhat of a 
misnomer.   
No matter how one defines legal positivism, one of its trademarks is that the law 
is not hidden and that is comes from people.  Formalism is a system that judges use to 
give legitimacy to law and lawmakers and commonly supports positivism.  However, the 
intentions of some lawmakers does not a law make and using the intentions of lawmakers 
is the equivalent of creating law by virtue of looking into a crystal ball.  It would be more 
correct to acknowledge originalism as a faux positivism that is reinforced by a framework 
that originalists - not lawmakers - create.  Furthermore, this type of formalism, as 
interpreted by originalists, is in direct contradiction to what formalism is supposed to do 
because it undermines the legitimacy of current lawmakers whose laws do not conform to 
the intentions or established principles of the Founders.   
In the United States, a hierarchy of law exists and some laws rank higher than 
others which – when there is a conflict of the two – will result in one law being rendered 
unconstitutional and one law being allowed to stand such as McCulloch v. Maryland or 
Brown v. Board of Education. The Warren Court’s decision, in Brown, can be seen as 
engaging in the same framework of national supremacy that is present in McCulloch.  
Whereas Marshall and Warren were appealing to an established hierarchy, originalists 
seem to want a balancing act or sharing of power between the states and the federal 
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government to occur.
208
  Again, there is no Constitutional provision that states the degree 
to which power sharing must occur.  Furthermore, concerning the Warren Court, the 
Fourteenth Amendment expressly forbade states from engaging in discriminatory 
practices. Therefore, the decision to allow a law to stand should not be made based on 
intentions that only some people can – by reading selective documents with selective 
purposes – see.  Furthermore, Michael Dorf has argued that originalists tend to look only 
at evidence that supports their interpretation which can be described as a narrow 
interpretation based on the Framers’ intentions of the Constitution while disregarding 
evidence that supports a broad interpretation.
209
  
 When discussing whether the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to eradicate 
segregation in public schools, Bork looked to the state of public schools in individual 
states and the District of Columbia and reasoned that because segregation was occurring 
there and did not stop after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, those who ratified 
the amendment must not have intended for segregation in public schools to cease.  
However, this narrative completely fails to take into account that Congress passed a slew 
of civil rights legislation between 1866 and 1875 that was designed specifically to 
eradicate racial discrimination.
210
 S.G.F. Spackman contended that “the Civil Rights Act 
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of 1875, was intended to spell out in specific terms the procedural guarantees of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments…”211  The Civil Rights Act of 1875 stated: 
“… all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the 
full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and 
privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places 
of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by 
law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any 
previous condition of servitude… That the… courts of the United States shall 
have exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and 
offenses against, and violations of, the provisions of this act . . .”212 
In 1883, the Supreme Court ruled that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional. 
The Court stated that the federal government lacked the authority to compel private 
citizens to cease discriminatory practices.
213
  Whether the federal government had this 
authority or not belies the point that it clearly intended to force the cessation of 
discriminatory practices at the state level and gave the authority to federal courts, which 
includes the Supreme Court, to do just that.  
Whittington looked to McCulloch and Dred Scott in order to show how a judge 
should not interpret the Constitution.  Those decisions had political and legal 
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consequences, as did decisions rendered by the Warren Court and every other Court in 
American history.  Judges must give decisions in tough cases, and – as Laurence Tribe 
wrote – originalism would allow the Court to “… abdicate responsibility for the choices 
that constitutional courts necessarily make.”214   
The idea that looking to the intentions of Founders can save judges from this duty 
or insulate their decisions from political consequences is false.  Furthermore, appeals to 
the Founders’ or ratifiers’ intent can miss valuable evidence.  This was the case regarding 
school desegregation.  Originalists focused on the fact that many of the representatives 
who voted for the Fourteenth Amendment had states with segregated schools and that 
Congress itself established segregated schools in the District of Columbia as evidence 
that integrated schools fell outside the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Warren 
Court looked to debates that were had by the thirty-ninth Congress and the Civil Right 
Act of 1866 which was passed, along with the Fourteenth Amendment, by the same 
Congress.
215
  However, when both originalists and the Warren Court appealed to the 
ratifiers’ intent regarding school segregation, they completely missed the Civil Rights Act  
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of 1875.
216
  Certainly, the Congress that passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was a 
different Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment but both sessions of Congress 
occurred during Reconstruction, and one of the aims of Reconstruction was to create a 
more just society for newly freed slaves.
217
  The larger point, however, is that originalism 
can neither protect Supreme Court decisions from entering the political fray nor can it 
assure that all evidence of Framers’ or ratifiers’ intent will be considered when the Court 
renders a decision.   
Additionally, there is no evidence that the Founders desired future generations to 
make decisions based on their intent.  There is, in fact, evidence that suggests the 
Founders never anticipated that future generations would be beholden to their 
intentions.
218
  Furthermore, scholars have noted that the embodiment of abstract 
principles contained in the Constitution is proof that the Founders envisioned a living 
Constitution that changed and adapted to each generation.
219
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From Dred Scott to Brown: the Rejection of Intent and the Recognition of 
Institutionally Enforced Discrimination 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Curtis criticized Chief Justice Taney for 
searching out the intentions of the Founders instead of simply relying on the text of the 
Constitution. Justice Curtis wrote: 
“… it is insisted, that whatever other powers Congress may have respecting the 
territory of the United States, the subject of negro slavery forms an exception. The 
Constitution declares that Congress shall have power to make ‘all needful rules 
and regulations’ respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The 
assertion is, though the Constitution says all, it does not mean all -- though it says 
all, without qualification, it means all except such as allow or prohibit slavery. It 
cannot be doubted that it is incumbent on those who would thus introduce an 
exception not found in the language of the instrument, to exhibit some solid and 
satisfactory reason, drawn from the subject-matter or the purposes and objects of 
the clause, the context, or from other provisions of the Constitution, showing that 
the words employed in this clause are not to be understood according to their 
clear, plain, and natural signification.” 
Justice Curtis’s excerpt from his dissenting opinion in Dred Scott beautifully illustrates 
one of the biggest problems with originalism because the Fourteenth Amendment states: 
“... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
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of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”220 
This amendment places no qualifiers as to when the states can decide not to extend an 
equal protection of the laws, and it – in fact – explicitly commands the states not to “deny 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  While both Bork and 
Whittington thought that Dred Scott was a horrible decision,
221
 the constitutional 
interpretive method they advanced would bring about more decisions comparable to 
Taney’s opinion in that case because it is an interpretive method that inherently seeks out 
qualifiers to provisions of the Constitution.  
 While Chief Justice Taney was preoccupied with determining the Founders’ intent 
regarding the citizenship status of the descendants of slaves, Justice Curtis wondered 
what the Founders thought about the expansion of slavery into the western territories.  As 
both men questioned the intentions of the Framers, they came to very different 
conclusions. 
In Plessy, the Court declared, “We consider the underlying fallacy of the 
plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two 
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason 
of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that 
construction upon it.”222  The Court’s assertion in Plessy that separate was equal 
complicated the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.  How could the courts bar 
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discriminatory practices committed by the states when the Fourteenth Amendment had 
been interpreted, by the Supreme Court, to mean that states – as a matter of public policy 
– could separate people.  The Court essentially said that discrimination was constitutional 
as long as the state discriminated equally, and if African Americans felt that 
discrimination placed them in a subordinate status then that was their own fault for 
choosing to feel that discrimination. 
In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, the Hughes Court stated, “The basic 
consideration here is not as to what sort of opportunities other States provide, or whether 
they are as good as those in Missouri, but as to what opportunities Missouri itself 
furnishes to white students and denies to negroes solely upon the ground of color.”223  As 
long as “separate but equal” remained the law of the land, the best – and simultaneously 
the worst – a black citizen could hope for was its enforcement. 
 Warren, in Brown, completely rejected the notion that one could essentially be 
both a separate yet equal member of society.  After the Court deliberated – but before it 
voted – Warren said, “… the more I’ve read and heard and thought, the more I’ve come 
to conclude that the basis of segregation and ‘separate but equal’ rest upon a concept of 
the inherent inferiority of the colored race.  I don’t see how Plessy and the cases 
following it can be sustained on any other theory.”224  This statement coupled with 
Warren’s assertion, in Brown, that the Court could not simply “turn the clock back to 
1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was 
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written”225 simultaneously rejected both schemes, in regards to the lawmakers’ intent in 
previous eras – concerining the civil rights of minorities in the twentieth century – and 
the argument that inferiority felt on the part of African Americans was a self imposed 
construction, as a sufficient reason to continue their oppression.  In so doing, the 
Supreme Court recognized that institutional oppression was not only real but that it was 
also enforced with the intention of creating a caste society.
226
  One could argue that, in 
Brown, Justice Curtis’s method of constitutional interpretation as found in Dred Scott 
was victorious.  
Legacy of the Warren Court 
After Brown, very little changed and many people wondered if the decision really 
had made a difference.
227
  Furthermore, the opinion in Brown only applied to segregation 
in public schools, however, before the Fourteenth Amendment could function properly, 
the wrongs of Plessy had to be righted which was exactly what Brown did.  As more 
challenges to end discrimination came before the Court, some people began to wonder 
why the Court had not issued a broader opinion, one that had the potential to ban all 
forms of race discrimination in Brown. Upon the commemoration of the fiftieth year 
anniversary of the Brown decision, Ian Haney Lopez argued that Warren had, indeed, 
written an opinion that called for the abolishment of a caste system – on the basis of race 
                                                          
225
 Brown v. Board of Education 
226
 In his memoirs Warren wrote, “… the vast majority of people must realize by now that racial equality 
under law is basic to our institutions and that we will not and cannot have peace in our nation until the 
race issue is properly settled.”; Warren, p.293 
227
 Rosenberg, Gerald N. “The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Generate Social Change?” In Courts, Judges, & 
Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process, by Walter F. Murphy, C. Herman Pritchett, Lee Epstein 
and Jack Knight, 727-742. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006. 
 78 
 
or ethnicity – in American society.228 In Hernandez v. Texas, an opinion released a mere 
two weeks before Brown, the Supreme Court stated: 
“Throughout our history differences in race and color have defined easily 
identifiable groups which have at times required the aid of the courts in securing 
equal treatment under the laws. But community prejudices are not static, and from 
time to time other differences from the community norm may define other groups 
which need the same protection. Whether such a group exists within a community 
is a question of fact. When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and it 
is further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that class for 
different treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of 
the Constitution have been violated. The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed 
solely against discrimination due to a "two-class theory" -- that is, based upon 
differences between "white" and Negro.”229 
In this opinion, the Court carried on – and recognized its importance in – the tradition of 
protecting minorities that was started by the Hughes Court, specifically in Carolene 
Products.  It further recognized that race as well as discrimination based on race was a 
complex issue that was constantly and continuously evolving. Finally, and most 
importantly, it recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment extended protections beyond 
those who were originally intended to be protected – which were freed black slaves after 
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the Civil War – again rejecting the notion that the written text of the Constitution should 
be governed by the Framers’ or ratifiers’ intent.230 
In Plessy, the Court had stated that segregation by the state – or treating people 
differently solely on the basis of race – was constitutional thus rendering minorities, 
specifically African Americans, as “politically equal” but “socially unequal.”  The 
Hughes Court later demanded that the state treat all of its citizens as politically and 
socially equal.  The Warren Court, in Brown, said that segregation among the citizenry by 
the state – “solely on the basis of race” – was unconstitutional regardless of the desire of 
the majority.  In Hernandez and Brown, the Court completely disregarded the notion that 
the state could treat all of its citizens with political and social equality while segregating 
them.  What made minorities unequal in society had nothing to do with how the state, on 
paper, treated them.  The physical act of separating them from white society was what 
rendered them inferior and thus – in the consciousness of whites – unequal.231  However, 
these cases dealt with discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity.  In the criminal 
protection and welfare cases, Warren added a second caveat to the evolution of anti-
discriminatory doctrine regarding state governments and their citizens which was that 
they could not discriminate – in regards to criminal protections or the giving of welfare – 
on the basis indigence.  By extending the Court’s protection to those in poverty, Warren 
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recognized that castes in America happened not only on racial and ethnic distinctions but 
also on socio-economic lines.   
One could argue that the Warren Court made great strides in eradicating a policy 
of unequal treatment on the basis of indigence by state governments.  In regards to the 
treatment of citizens in poverty, the welfare cases were his equivalent of the Hughes 
Court’s decision in Missouri ex. rel Gaines insofar as the Warren Court ruled that states 
had to treat all citizens as politically and socially equal.  However, when it comes to 
indigence in the United States and the treatment of the poor by the citizenry, the country 
has not yet seen a decision akin to Hernandez or Brown.  
During Warren’s tenure as Chief Justice, the Supreme Court was labeled as an 
“activist court.”  While critics of Warren claimed that he had no legal basis to rule the 
way he did in many of his decisions, Warren understood that segregation was no longer 
acceptable in a country whose Constitution promised freedom from discrimination to all 
of its people.
232
 Warren further understood that equality before the law, the distinction 
made in Plessy, did not always translate to a practice of equality. G. Edward White 
argued that Warren understood that intervention by the judiciary was sometimes 
necessary because legislatures did not always have the people’s best interest in mind.233  
Furthermore, Warren understood - unlike his critics – that decisions had real impact in a 
concrete world which is something that originalists fail to understand. 
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 Brown and Hernandez were emblematic of all cases that were discussed in this 
chapter.  Discrimination was present in all other cases because the state had targeted 
certain populations it felt were not fulfilling essential obligations of good citizenship.  
People were targeted and denied constitutional protections because their skin was the 
wrong phenotype, they did not hold an appropriate place on the socio-economic ladder, 
they lived in the wrong place,
234
 or they refused to carry out societal expectations of 
married couples.  The only difference between Brown and Hernandez and the other cases 
is that discrimination had a physical manifestation of segregation that was present in 
Brown and Hernandez that was not present in the other cases.   
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 The Warren Court was not an activist court.  In expanding civil rights and 
liberties it simply furthered a trend begun much earlier.  This trend seems to go unnoticed 
because scholars usually regard the Hughes Court as an activist court in the economic 
sphere while ignoring major civil liberties decisions that were being rendered at that time 
as well.  The exception to this would, of course, be a footnote in Carolene Products.  
While Carolene Products is an important case concerning the Court’s role as a protector 
of minorities, it was not the only case. Furthermore, footnote four of Carolene Products 
was of unknown value at the time.  
Just as G. Edward White and Barry Cushman argued that doctrinal changes had 
been occurring before the switch in time which aided in the facilitation of the regulatory 
state, the Supreme Court was also rendering decisions which created small, incremental 
changes in regards to civil liberties and civil rights.  By the time Earl Warren became 
Chief Justice, enough incremental changes had occurred for him to create big changes.  
Warren was merely swept up into a trend that had commenced well before he was Chief 
Justice as was the Hughes Court in regards to economic regulation.  
While originalists designated Carolene Products as the genesis of Warren Court 
activism, they failed to recognize the magnitude of the civil rights/civil liberties 
expansion that pre-dated Warren’s tenure.  Through this lens, it seems as though the 
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Court used this power sparingly until Warren became Chief Justice, but, as the Hughes 
Court chapter suggests, that was simply not the case.  Also, the Hughes Court was limited 
in what it could do regarding civil rights due to Plessy v. Fergusson and the doctrine of 
“separate but equal.”  Furthermore, originalism – as a critique of the Warren Court and as 
a strand of jurisprudence itself – is unable to offer a legitimate alternative to the Warren 
Court’s interpretive method.235  Both society and the Constitution are continuously 
evolving and this was no less true during the twentieth century.  Originalists have 
criticized the idea of a living constitution.  Whether the United States has a living 
constitution or not is an issue for debate, however, in Blaisdell, the Court left no doubt 
that – irrespective of the living constitution – America definitely has a malleable 
Constitution.   
As was shown in the Warren Court chapter, the United States would be a very 
different country today if the Court was obliged to interpret the Constitution based on an 
originalist interpretive method.  Furthermore, in his decisions, Warren explicitly rejected 
an appeal to the Founders’ or ratifiers’ intent because he understood that an appeal to 
such intent would do nothing more than preserve the status quo.  Warren, like Justice 
Breyer, understood that judges are not placed on the bench to act as historians. Rather, 
they are placed on the bench to adjudicate.   
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In ending discriminatory practices, the Warren Court appealed to the same 
hierarchy Chief Justice Marshall did in McCulloch.  Warren recognized the absolute 
primacy of the Fourteenth Amendment over the states unlike originalists, such as Bork, 
who favored a states’ rights approach.  Bork argued the Court should not have interfered 
with state policies because if people felt discrimination they were at liberty to move.  Of 
course, people do not always have the means and resources to move, but that completely 
misses the point.  The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees freedom from discriminatory 
practices from the states – all states – and the residents of one state should not have to 
move to another state in order to enjoy their constitutional protections.  Furthermore, 
originalists seemed to not grasp the fact that the controversial decisions rendered by the 
Warren Court would not have been necessary had the states not been engaging in 
discriminatory acts.   
As I neared the end of this research, I found that defining judicial activism 
remained a difficult task.  As Kmiec wrote this is true because activism can mean 
different things to different people.  One of the ways I attempted to circumvent this 
problem was by not providing my own definition of activism.  When trying to question 
the way in which scholars have misused this term, I employed a definition of activism 
that was used by a specific scholar and demonstrated how this scholar’s definition was 
faulty when applied to situations that implied activism, based on a standard that had been 
set by the same scholar, however the scholar failed to recognize the establishment of 
activism by his own standard.  For example, Bork had absolutely no problem with the 
outcome of the cases the Hughes Court decided pre-switch in time.  He simply does not 
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agree with the reasoning the Court used to reach that conclusion.  Conversely, Bork 
disapproves of both the reasoning and the outcome of a case like Griswold.  Bork does 
not see any inconsistency here because he was primarily concerned with the protection of 
federalism and not necessarily with the outcome as it related to the parties involved in the 
case.  So, he would admonish some decisions harsher than others by determining their 
effects on federalism.  While Bork scolded Warren for imposing judge made values, he 
was essentially putting forward an interpretive method that did the same thing by 
advocating an interpretive method that protected a degree of federalism he found suitable 
though I doubt he realized that. 
When I began researching this thesis, I had hoped to compare and contrast the 
Hughes and Warren Court to show that the Hughes Court was somehow different from 
the Warren Court.  If the Hughes Court was different and it was the first court to be 
labeled as an activist court then logic would have dictated that the Warren Court was not 
an activist court.  However, the more I researched, the more I realized that the Hughes 
Court was not much different from the Warren Court.  Both Courts found themselves in 
turbulent times in American history. The Hughes Court rendered economic activist 
decisions during the Great Depression and the Warren Court delivered activist decisions 
in the realm of civil rights and civil liberties during the Civil Rights movement.  Whereas 
the Hughes Court stood in the way of economic progress, the Warren Court seemed to 
usher in new standards for civil rights and liberties.  The ideological composition of the 
Court was the catalyst for both Courts.  The Hughes Court ceased its activist behavior 
when Roosevelt was able to place his own justices – justices he felt would support his 
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policies – on the Court.  While this Court deferred to legislatures on economic policy, it 
also continued the practice of expanding civil liberties and recognized the Court had a 
role to play in the protection of minorities.  By the time Warren became Chief Justice, he 
merely carried on the tradition started by previous Courts.  If Warren was simply carrying 
on a tradition that had begun with previous Courts, why is his Court considered to be an 
activist court?   
The larger question addressed by this research centered on the role of the 
Supreme Court in American democracy.  As I began to understand that the Warren Court 
was placed in an activist realm because of that Court’s protection of minority groups, the 
question again changed and became: To whom is the Supreme Court beholden?  
Legislatures or the people?  In theory, they should be one and the same.  In practice, 
however, legislatures often employ various mechanisms to prevent the practice or 
effectiveness of universal suffrage.  This was the whole reason the Warren Court had to 
render the decisions it did in Baker and Reynolds.  This question, however, still did not 
address what activism was nor did it address whether the Warren Court was activist. 
Prior to my research, I had not realized how much the concept of judicial 
activism, initially introduced by Arthur Schlesinger, had been influenced by originalism. 
Throughout my research, I chased a definition of activism which changed depending on 
the facts and circumstances that developed around any particular case.  I eventually came 
to realize that, when a claim of judicial activism was made, originalists were really saying 
 87 
 
that the authority of the sovereign had been undermined.
236
  The conceptual problem with 
the idea of undermining the authority of the sovereign is that the Constitution never 
makes it clear where sovereignty lies.  Does sovereignty lie with the Constitution?  In the 
people?  With the legislatures? If it lies with the legislature, does it lie with the national 
or state legislatures?  At some point, these sovereignties will come into conflict and the 
Court will have to determine which sovereignty will win and which sovereignty will lose.  
If one believes in federalism and states’ rights, then a Supreme Court that voids state laws 
– as the Warren Court did – may appear as an activist court. If one believes in the 
primacy of the national legislature, then the pre-switch in time Hughes Court could be 
perceived as an activist court. Of course the Warren Court voided state law, but it did so 
because it thought those laws violated the Constitution. In response to this, originalists 
first criticized Warren for not being deferential enough, then created principles that they 
argued could be found in the spirit of the Constitution but not necessarily in the written 
text.  Whittington contended that activism would be easy to recognize because an activist 
decision was basically a political decision whereas an interpretive decision was 
essentially a legalistic one.  However, all of the activist decisions covered in this thesis – 
from both the Hughes and Warren Courts – had political consequences.  As long as the 
Hughes Court obstructed the New Deal poor people would continue to suffer.  Had the 
Warren Court allowed “separate but equal” to remain the law of the land, people of color 
would have continued to suffer.  Either way, there would have been political as well as 
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legal consequences.  Thus, the distinction between a legal and political decision is not an 
easy one to make. 
Chief Justice Earl Warren and his Court did nothing more than prevent the states 
from arbitrarily discriminating against their own citizens which is an outcome that was 
secured to the people through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Therefore, any jurisprudential 
theory that creates a process capable of disenfranchising the people of this guaranty has 
no legitimate place in constitutional law and is not rightfully able to criticize a Court for 
ensuring that society, which includes the states, was fulfilling its constitutional 
obligations to all people and not just the people it likes.   
One of the biggest limitations to this thesis was the lack of primary sources used 
in contextualizing the importance, or lack thereof, of the cases discussed.  When I began 
this research, I had not fully realized how important these cases were going to be because 
I was primarily concerned with discussing judicial activism and whether or not it had 
been committed by the Warren Court from an abstract or conceptual standpoint.  
However, I soon realized that only an account of the two Courts could show the different 
scenarios each Court faced.  The retelling of these accounts allowed me to place the 
Courts in their proper place historically, not only from a popular point of view, but from 
the stand point of changes that preceded each Court regarding changes in constitutional 
interpretation.  I thought using secondary sources from other scholars would allow me to 
do this sufficiently, but I now believe that having more information from the Justices’ 
papers, discussions they might have had among themselves, and reaction from the public 
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concerning their decisions would have been extremely useful in further placing these 
Courts in their proper historical role. 
 As previously stated, one of the most significant findings of this thesis, in regards 
to the myth of Warren Court activism, was that the Hughes Court had already begun a 
trend of expanding civil liberties some two decades before Earl Warren became Chief 
Justice.  The question that still looms, at the end of this thesis, is why has the expansion 
of civil liberties, under the Hughes Court, gone unnoticed by both originalist and non-
originalist scholars?  
Scholars have challenged originalism conceptually, but I had not seen - prior to 
my research - a challenge to originalists applying the term of judicial activism to the 
Warren Court.  This might be because it is very difficult to challenge an assertion of 
activism when the people who leveled the claim have created their own rules governing 
what does and does not constitute judicial activism.  One must remember that the concept 
of judicial activism did exist before originalism, however, it was the originalists who 
changed what that concept was.  Therefore, it is completely legitimate to question not 
only the reasons that existed for this conceptual change but also why the originalists 
thought that a change in the definition of what constituted activism was needed in the 
first place.  It is in this question that I see an opportunity for further scholarly exploration. 
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